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Abstract 
 
Starting from the observation that at the multilateral level shareholder activism is 
considered as an important aspect of good corporate governance, this paper 
examines several legal and economic obstacles to institutional investor activism in 
the EU and in the US. We also examine the voting record of 76 institutional 
investors in the US and of several others in the EU. We find that US investors seem 
to have easier access to proxy voting than in the EU (although recent EU legislation 
should remove several of the present legal obstacles); that conflicts of interest seem 
to limit the activism of several categories of institutional investors both in the US 
and in the EU; that some national legislations limit the ability of institutional 
investors to coordinate their voting policies; and that recourse to stock lending and 
other forms of separation of financial risk from voting rights seems to be practiced 
more by controlling shareholders at the expense of institutional investors than the 
opposite. We also find that institutional investors in the US seem to have a more 
adversarial voting pattern vis-à-vis company managements than in the UK; this 
might be due to the fewer voting rights given to shareholders by the US regulatory 
framework. As for Europe, institutional investors' voting pattern is by far the most 
adversarial in France, where there is a high incidence of control-enhancing 
mechanisms. Institutional investors seem to have an adversarial voting stance also 
in Greece, Belgium and Sweden, where control-enhancing mechanisms are also 
present, while in Italy they tend to have a low voting turnout. More in general, EU 
investors’ voting pattern seems to be sensitive to the presence of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, ownership concentration, and to the origin of the national legal 
system.  
                                                 
1 The views expressed in the article represent exclusively the positions of the authors and do not involve in any 
way the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. We thank Marcello Bianchi, Jean-Nicolas Caprasse, Francesco 
Chiappetta, Christophe Clerc, Michäela D'Orazio, Carmine Di Noia, Christel Dumas, Silvia Giacomelli, Hans Hirt, 
Zsofia Kerecsen, Ida Levine, Ivo Maes, Graziella Marras, Marcello Messori, Thomas O'Malley, Hendrik Otto, Elena 
Tedesco, Corinna Ullrich, Ludmila Zalik and the participants to the conference Shareholder Rights, Shareholder 
Voting, and Corporate Performance held in Cagliari on 21-22 March 2008 for their very helpful observations and 
suggestions. A special thank to Antonio Salerno and Andy Eggers for their support and advice. Of course the 
authors are the sole responsible for errors and omissions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The traditional economic reasoning by which shareholders must take governance 
decisions in the company is based on the circumstance that they are holders of 
residual claims, in the sense that they are paid with the residual amount which 
remains once the other constituencies of the company have been paid. As they have 
the rights to the residual amount, they have an interest in increasing the economic 
results of the company By taking complete control of the residue, shareholders have 
an interest in maximising the company’s economic results. Therefore, the most 
functional organisation for the corporation is also the most efficient one2. 
 
As observed by Gillan and Starks (2007),3 shareholder activism may have several 
contents, from the simple fact that acquiring and selling shares is already a form of 
interest in company life, to voting management proposals, presenting and voting 
shareholder resolutions, and at the other end of the spectrum to initiate takeovers 
and LBOs. As observed by Bianchi and Enriques (2001),4 Capital International,5 
and HFWG (2008), institutional investors see voting as just one of several possible 
instruments to monitor portfolio companies and induce change in their governance 
rules. Investors who take on a more pronounced role in dealing with companies in 
which they own shares with a view to encouraging behaviour more beneficial to 
shareholders are often referred to as “activist” investors. This includes, but is not 
limited to, engaging in discussions with management on issues such as overall 
company strategy, capital structure, dividend policy, merger or de-merger decisions 
and executive compensation. It could ultimately result in the investor exercising its 
voting power to effect changes that the investor believes will increase the value of its 
investment in the company. On the other hand, the term shareholder activism for 
mutual funds and pension funds seems to be restricted to voting at general 
meetings. The emerging best practice for pension funds and mutual funds seems 
focused in the first place on voting for the great majority of the shares held. 
However, the picture is not so clear-cut: as observed by HFWG (2008), while the 
term activism is often used to describe hedge fund managers, it is important to note 
that a large number of activist investors are clearly not hedge fund managers, and 
most hedge fund managers do not pursue activist strategies. Moreover, even if a 
manager is labeled as being activist, this does not mean that it engages actively 
with all companies in which it invests. 
 
According to Gillan and Starks (2007)6 and Gordon (2008),7 shareholder activism in 
the US dates back to the beginning of the 20th Century, with insurance companies, 
mutual funds, and banks as main actors. The Glass Steagall Act and the regulatory 
reforms that followed the stock market crash of 1929 determined a sharp decline in 
investors' activism. SEC's introduction in 1942 of a rule that allowed shareholders 
to submit proposals for inclusion on corporate ballots set the main vehicle for 
shareholder participation in post-war company life which is used even today. The 
re-emergence of institutional investors' activism dates to the 1980s, with public 
pension funds and union funds submitting shareholder proposals and pressuring 
                                                 
2 See Easterbrook and Fischel (1983).  
3 P. 5. 
4 P. 8. 
5 Information provided to the authors. 
6 P. 3-4. 
7 P. 6. 
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management for corporate reforms on such corporate governance issues as board 
structure, takeover defensive tactics, executive compensation, and the vote required 
for director election. As reported by Gordon (2008),8 in the 1990s and early 2000s 
institutional investors focused their attention on the election of directors, with the 
aim initially to manifest their disapproval for poor corporate performance by voting 
against or withholding their vote for the entire board, and then focusing their 
campaigns on the rejection of specific directors who did not satisfy determined 
corporate governance standards, for instance in terms of remuneration, personal 
performance. According to Gillan and Starks (2007), in the last years hedge funds 
and private equity funds have adopted an activist stance as monitors of corporate 
performance. Such funds are not necessarily short-term investors and in a 
significant number of cases acquire large, relatively long-term positions in 
underperforming companies.  
 
The OECD Corporate Governance Principles 9  explicitly refer to institutional 
investors' activism as well as to the need for its protection and facilitation. In Part 
One, Section II (F) of the Principles, which is devoted to the rights of shareholders 
and key ownership functions, it is stated that "the exercise of ownership rights by 
all shareholders, including institutional investors, should be facilitated". In Part 
Two, the OECD Principles provides some annotations to the mentioned principle, 
stating that although the Principles do not seek to prescribe the optimal degree of 
investor activism, many investors in considering the costs and benefits of exercising 
their ownership rights are likely to conclude that positive financial returns and 
growth can be obtained by undertaking a reasonable amount of analysis and by 
using their rights (Part Two, Section II, F). Another explicit reference to institutional 
investors' role is made in Part One, Section II, G according to which "shareholders, 
including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each other 
on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, 
subject to exceptions to prevent abuse". Moreover, Section III of the OECD 
Principles states that the "corporate governance framework should protect 
shareholders rights, which includes equitable treatment for all shareholders 
including minority and foreign shareholders". The Principles are one of the 12 Key 
Standards for Sound Financial Systems issued by the Financial Stability Forum.10  
 
According to OECD (2003), there is a need to focus on additional issues which need 
to be dealt with if shareholders are to be able to exercise their control effectively. 
One of the key issues which stand out is improving the possibilities for shareholder 
voice to be effective, e.g. facilitating voting rights. Such a goal is closely linked to the 
role of institutional investors to strengthen corporate governance and monitor 
company performance. The Survey also stresses that such goals critically depend 
on the institutional investors' internal governance mechanisms.  
 
From the consultation process conducted by European Commission (2007c), it has 
emerged that in parallel with their increase in ownership of total listed share capital, 
institutional investors are increasingly aware of the importance to prevent 
controlling shareholders' conflicts of interest. The main instrument chosen seems to 
be making more frequently use of the voting rights attached to their shares.  
 
According to HFWG (2008), assets under management by the hedge fund industry 
have significantly increased over recent years and hedge funds have become 
                                                 
8 P. 7-8. 
9 OECD (2004).  
10 http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/key_standards_for_sound_financial_system.html  
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powerful participants in equity markets. As part of their duties to their clients, 
hedge fund managers should participate, where possible, in corporate decisions 
that affect the performance of investments. However, it may not be part of a 
manager’s strategy to vote all proxies (e.g., “black box” traders) and a manager 
might, for cost benefit considerations, adopt a systematic approach, for example 
never voting except in exceptional circumstances, rather than evaluating each proxy 
situation. 
 
In the US the Council of Institutional Investors provides non-binding guidelines to 
more than 140 public, labour, and corporate pension funds. Among its stated 
objectives is that "shareowners should have meaningful ability to participate in the 
major fundamental decisions that affect corporate viability, and meaningful 
opportunities to suggest or nominate director candidates and to suggest processes 
and criteria for director selection and evaluation."11 
 
In the US voting is also explicitely recommended, if not mandated, for shares in 
employee plan investment portfolios. The guidance provided by the US Department 
of Labor to sections 402-4 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) specifies that activities intended to monitor or influence the management of 
corporations in which the plan owns stock include exercising the legal right of a 
shareholder.12 
 
The purpose of this paper is to review the theoretic debate which has produced the 
current institutional consensus on the necessity of shareholder activism, and to 
examine some of the existing legal and economic obstacles to investor activism 
taking into account the structural differences of the various types of institutional 
investors. In the last part of the paper we examine the voting record of 76 
institutional investors in the US and the available voting record in the EU. The 
purpose is to verify whether the sensitivity of investors’ voting patterns is sensitive 
to specific obstacles to investor activism. Chapter 2 illustrates the theoretic debate 
on investor activism; chapter 3 provides quantitative information on the importance 
of institutional investors’ shareholdings in the EU and the US; chapter 4 illustrates 
several sources of legal obstacles to proxy voting; chapter 5 examines whether 
conflicts of interest limit shareholder activism; chapter 6 examines legislation in the 
EU and the US preventing investors’ coordination of their voting policies; chapter 7 
examines the consequences on shareholder activism of separating voting rights 
from economic risk; chapter 8 examines institutional investors’ voting record; 
chapter 9 concludes.  
 
II. THE THEORETIC DEBATE ON INVESTOR ACTIVISM 
  
The usefulness of shareholder activism is not uncontested and has been the subject 
of an academic dispute over the assessment of its effectiveness in terms of 
producing a better performance from target companies. Several studies consider 
such activism as irrelevant and even harmful for most shareholders.13 The debate is 
still open and sometimes causes bitter disputes which are unusual in the academic 
world. The fact that the governance of Delaware is board-oriented indicates that 
shareholders have limited power of action, that many choices are taken in isolation 
from the board, and that proxy fights are regulated in favour of the incumbent 
                                                 
11 Council of Institutional Investors (2007), p. 2. 
12  US Department of Labor, Interpretative Bulletin 94-2. Information provided to the authors by Capital 
International. 
13 For a survey on this subject see Gillian and Starks (2007). 
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board. Shareholders' limited power includes introducing amendments to the articles 
of incorporation, mergers, sales of all or a substantial part of the corporation’s 
assets, dissolution, and election and removal of directors.  With the exception of the 
removal and election of members of the board of directors, everything else takes 
places at the initiative of the board itself. Shareholders can only apply a veto.14 
Nonetheless, shareholders have a way to make themselves heard: this is 
represented by precatory resolutions, which are voted on at the shareholders’ 
meeting. However, even if they obtain a majority of votes, they are not binding for 
the management.15 
 
According to Lucian Bebchuck the Delaware law should be transformed from 
board–oriented to shareholder-oriented. Bebchuck does not agree with the 
construction of the American corporate law as a form of representative democracy 
and believes, again for the purposes of increasing the performance of a company, in 
the model of direct democracy. For the purposes of maximising the performance of 
the company and its value, the powers of shareholders must be increased, in 
particular the powers of action. In Bebchuck’s view, this reasoning is equally valid 
for both the corporate governance rules, the “rules of the game” which regard the 
corporate charter and the choice of the state of incorporation, and for business 
decisions16. In particular Bebchuck maintains that power of action to disband the 
company should be allocated to shareholders, since it is not in the interests of 
management to do so and lose their jobs, as well as the power to decide the 
distribution of dividends to slow the inefficient wish of management to build its own 
economic empire, the power to modify the “rules of the game” of corporate 
governance, the power of action of shareholders together with the possibility of 
approving binding resolutions. The author collects empirical evidence that US 
company boards tend to disregard shareholders’ will to repeal staggered boards 
despite the approval by shareholders of non-binding resolutions in this sense for 
several consecutive years. The conclusion drawn by the author is that the existing 
shareholder powers in the US are not sufficient to persuade management to adopt 
governance changes desired by shareholders17. 
 
Bebchuck has received several criticisms, mainly based on the success which 
American corporate law, especially that of the State of Delaware, has had in 
accompanying the development of the US economy. It has been said that 
transforming the corporation into a “town meeting” would have costs unmatched by 
the benefits. There is an initial objection that holds that “election reform…would 
lead to large-scale disruption of corporate management”. Management would be 
engaged for months every one or two years in its own electoral campaign. The 
selection of management would no longer be the same, since people destined to be 
fired within two years would be of a lower standard than those of today.18 
 
Another argument holds that shareholders do not all have the same interest, i.e. 
maximising the value of the shares, but rather particular interests are at play. As 
Vice Chancellor Strine suggests, the ”institutions most inclined to be activist 
investors are associated with state governments and labor unions, (which) often 
                                                 
14 See Welch and Turezyn (2007). 
15Precatory resolutions were allowed for the first time by the New York Court of Appeal in the case Auer v. 
Dressel. N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954). It is interesting to notice that Council of Institutional Investors (2007), p. 3, 
recommends that "Boards should take actions recommended in shareowner proposals that receive a majority of 
votes cast for and against." 
16 Bebchuck (2005). 
17 Bebchuck (2005) at 843 and ff.   
18 Lipton and Savitt (2007), at 746-747.  
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appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase the economic 
performance of the companies in which they invest” 19 . According to Stephen 
Bainbridge the most active institutional investors today are pension funds which 
follow different interests from those of other shareholders, in particular they 
promote the interests of workers, as the empirical evidence shows. The same author 
observes that such a complex organisation as a business needs a decision-making 
centre with authority and not subject to interference from others, in particular 
shareholders. The idea of attributing greater power to shareholders arises from the 
conviction that they have a common interest: maximising the value of shares. 
However, “once uncertainty is introduced it would be surprising if shareholder 
opinions did not differ on which course will maximize share value”20. There is also a 
problem of short-termism, that is interest in gaining the maximum possible in the 
least time possible, while the board of directors is called on to pursue a long–term 
focus21. Martin Lipton and William Savitt  state that “Also central to Bebchuck’s 
critique is the myth that as “owner” of the corporation, shareholders should be 
empowered to retain the focus and direction of the corporation they own. 
Shareholders do not “own” corporations. They own securities- shares of stock – 
which entitle them to very limited electoral rights and the right to share in the 
financial returns produced by the corporation’s business operations”.  They “have 
no more claim to intrinsic ownership and control of the corporation’s assets than do 
other stakeholders”22. 
 
A theory by which power must be in the hands of the board emphasises the 
inability of shareholders to be informed and therefore to take decisions which 
maximise the value of the company. In a complex organisation, people must 
specialise. Directors and managers specialize in the efficient coordination of other 
specialists. If the presence of an autonomous board of directors increases the 
agency costs, it also promotes the formation of an efficient and informed will, 
discourages opportunism among shareholders and, above all, encourages value 
specific investments in the business, understood as an organisation which operates 
as a team23. Regarding this last point, it is noted that it is not solely a category of 
stakeholders, i.e. the shareholders, who undertake specific investments, but in a 
more or less explicit way all stakeholders are called on to construct the business. It 
is also noted that economists have long recognised that formal contracts cannot 
protect specific investments in team production. Consequently, all “specific 
investors”, whether they are shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers or 
employees, are vulnerable to expropriation by someone who has control of the 
company. This person could be represented by the class of shareholders.  
 
Pacces in Bianchi et al. (2005, p. 43-83) and in Pacces (2008) refuses the relevance 
of the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers. According 
to the author, the manager entrepreneur who makes asset-specific investments 
makes recourse to the capital market with the objective to retain control. In Pacces 
vision, entrepreneurs seek to retain control to keep asset-specific investments in 
the company and to pursue idiosyncratic private benefits, 24  which are also 
                                                 
19 Strine (2007) at 1765. 
20 Bainbridge (2006) at 20. 
21 On these matters see Lipton and Savitt (2007). 
22 Lipton and Savitt (2007) at 754. 
23 Stout (2007) at 42.    
24  Pacces derives the concept of idiosyncratic benefits of control from Clifford G.Holderness, A Survey of 
Blockholders and corporate Control, 9 Economic Policy Review, 51, April (2003), and Ronald J. Gilson, 
Complicating the Controlling Shareholder Taxonomy mimeo (2004) and subsequently: Controlling Shareholder 
and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (2006).  
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beneficial to the other shareholders. Pacces derives his theory from his observation 
that managerial entrenchment is ubiquitous across countries, including the UK and 
the US where share ownership is dispersed. The main difference he sees across 
systems is that some legal frameworks (the US, the UK) allow the entrepreneur to 
retain just a minimal stake in the company and stay entrenched, while others (Italy, 
France) require the entrepreneur to keep a sizable share ownership in the company.  
 
2.1. Shareholders vs Board of directors 
The next question is: why do investors in public corporations cede control over the 
company assets to the board of directors, rather than keep such control for 
themselves? 
 
The most widely accepted theory is that which attributes to the board a monitoring 
role. This is the “monitoring model of the board”. A limited and specialised group 
such as the board of directors can take more efficient decisions than dispersed and 
uninformed shareholders. Moreover, because of the way they are selected and paid, 
directors have the ability to make impartial and disinterested choices compared to 
executive officers. The monitoring model of the board maintains that the central 
economic function of the board consists in reducing the agency costs which 
executives would otherwise impose on shareholders. Directors are therefore agents 
of shareholders who have the function of controlling the work of other agents of the 
shareholders, i.e. executive officers. Directors are in a relatively good position to 
carry out this function since they have fewer conflicts of interest than executive 
officers, while compared to shareholders they can more easily observe executives' 
behaviour and take responsive actions.25  
 
An alternative theory can be defined as the “Mediating Theory of the Board”26. This 
theory considers that executives are not the only possible exploiters in the company 
and shareholders the possible exploited, but the latter can in their turn be 
exploiters. Shareholders can in fact expropriate creditors, minority shareholders, 
employees and suppliers. Shareholder opportunism arises from the fact that 
various subjects make specific investments in the company. This means that they 
cannot easily withdraw their investment and sell it for its full value elsewhere. They 
are then at risk to be expropriated by the shareholders. How can the shareholders 
then induce these subjects to make specific investments in the company? To resolve 
the problem of mutual opportunism, the members of the team which invest in the 
company prefer to transfer control to an external subject: the board of directors. 
 
However, the mediating theory of the board of directors has also been subject to 
criticisms. The academic who has most stressed its fallibility is Bebchuck, who 
maintains that, by isolating management from ownership, other stakeholders can 
only be protected wholly by chance. Bebchuck recognises the existence of rare 
cases where the sacrifice of shareholders’ interests can advantage stakeholders, but 
he does not consider that the measure of isolating the board from the shareholders 
is particularly adequate. Firstly, there is no guarantee that the board uses its power 
to maximise the collective wellbeing of the various constituencies. The courts are 
not able to assess if this end has been pursued 27 . Indeed, the interests of 
management seem more aligned, at least partially, to those of shareholders than to 
those of stakeholders. While managers usually have part of their wealth in the form 
of shares and options, they normally do not have part of their wealth linked to the 
                                                 
25 Shavell (2005). 
26 Shavell (2005, p. 677 ff.)  
27 Bebchuck (1990, p. 910). 
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wealth of bondholders or employees. The current practices for paying management 
rarely reflect the idea of a board whose duty is to maximise the overall wellbeing of 
the various constituencies28. Another criticism29 to the mediating theory is that this 
theory refers exclusively to public companies, but does not refer to companies, 
including publicly traded ones, which have a controlling shareholder. In these cases 
ownership and control are reunited. How can this theory be applied to these cases? 
It seems improbable to imagine a solution in which the board is isolated from the 
influence of the controlling shareholder. 
 
III. The present situation  
 
In this section we examine the available data on shareholder ownership and 
presence at general meetings, with particular reference to institutional investors.  
3.1. How many foreign shareholders in the EU? 
Available data show that already a significant and increasing level of foreign 
ownership characterizes the listed companies across the EU. According to FESE 
(2004) and (2007), the weighted average of non-resident investors’ proportion of the 
listed shares of European markets was 29% in 2003 and 33% in 2005 (Table 1). 
Moreover, a significant part of these foreign shareholders seems to be made of non-
resident institutional investors. 30  Table 1 also shows the presence of foreign 
shareholders in several EU countries: at the lowest end of the spectrum there are 
Italy and Germany, where foreign shareholders own respectively 13% and 20% of 
total shares; at the other end of the spectrum we find The Netherlands where 
foreign ownership of listed companies reaches almost 70%. In between, close to the 
EU average of 33%, we find France, Poland, Sweden, Spain, and the UK.  
3.2. Do foreign shareholders and institutional investors vote in the EU?  
In the previous paragraph observed that a sizable amount of the shareholders in EU 
listed companies are cross-border shareholders and that a significant part of them 
is made of institutional investors. The next logical step is to understand how many 
foreign shareholders show up to vote. The available data seem to indicate that 
foreign participation at general meetings is poor.  
With regard to the attendance of foreign shareholders at annual general meetings 
(AGMs) of some German and Finnish listed companies, figures in Table 2 show a 
very low attendance rate at GMs of foreign shareholders either with regard to total 
share capital and, more important, with regard to the percentage of shares owned 
by foreign shareholders. An important caveat should be made with regard to 
controlling foreign shareholders or in any case to foreign shareholders who have a 
sizable participation in the company. The case of Polish listed companies (Table 2) 
shows that in such cases foreign shareholders manage to be present at GMs and to 
vote. Of course, this could just mean that small non-controlling cross-border 
shareholders are not interested to vote. In this case such low voting rates could be 
explained on minority shareholders’ “rational apathy”31 and not on legal obstacles 
to cross-border voting. That it may not be so is suggested by the fact that foreign 
shareholders that show up to vote at GMs as a percentage of total shares owned by 
foreign shareholders are significantly fewer than domestic shareholders as a 
percentage of total shares owned by domestic shareholders (Table 2).  
                                                 
28 ID, at 911. 
29 Steven Shavell, The Case for Increasing, supra note 18 at 909. 
30 FESE (2004), p. 1. 
31 Berle and Means (1932). See also Olson (1971). 
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However, the trend, at least in some EU Member States, seems to signal an increase 
in institutional investors' awareness of the importance to vote. According to the 
survey conducted by NAPF (2007), it is the norm for large pension funds to vote in 
the US, Japan and at least some European markets, as well as in the UK. As well as 
setting out their general voting policy in a public document, one third of funds 
surveyed disclose details of how specific votes have been cast at company meetings. 
More funds are exercising their voting rights overseas. Big majorities vote in Europe, 
the US and Japan, while almost half cast votes attached to stocks listed on 
emerging market exchanges. 
 
3.3. How many shares held by institutional investors in the EU and the US? 
According to Maes (2007), a crucial structural development in recent years has 
been the growth of institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies. Against a background of ageing populations and rising longevity, a 
larger proportion of household savings is now being placed in private-funded 
pension schemes and life insurance policies investing directly in equity and 
corporate bonds. Moreover, in the last years the enhanced role of institutional 
investors, like pension and mutual funds and insurance companies, and other new 
actors, such as hedge funds, has been crucial for the rise of financial markets. 
 
NAPF (2007) underlines that large pension funds are continuing to take their 
responsibilities as shareholders seriously and are actively engaging with the 
companies in which they invest. It reports complete awareness, among the funds, of 
the ISC Statement of principles. Such Statement reflects the Myners Review 's 
conclusions on the importance of shareholder engagement and sets out best 
practice for institutional shareholders and their agent in respect of the companies 
in which they invest . ISC Principles have been incorporated into managers' 
contracts by two thirds of funds surveyed by NAPF, and the very largest funds are 
most likely to have implemented them. Moreover, half of the respondents think that 
ISC principles have changed pension funds' engagement activities. 
 
There is evidence that EU institutional investors are increasingly diversifying their 
equity portfolios. According to ECB (2007a), the share of investment funds' total 
holdings of all shares and other equity (excluding investment fund shares/units) 
issued by residents of the euro area outside the Member States in which the 
investment fund is located went from about 16% in 1998 to about 24% in 2006. 
 
According to Capital International, the introduction of a single European currency 
has allowed institutional investors with domestic liabilities to diversify their 
holdings across the currency zone. This has in turn reduced the percentage of 
shares held by domestic investors in companies in their home markets as well as 
increasing the liquidity of shares in those companies.32 
 
Institutional investor activism has also recently been encouraged by the rising 
number of institutional investors (among which a few very important European 
pension funds) that have a focused portfolio of company holdings for which they 
invest sizable sums in every company. As shown by Becht et al. (2006), in such 
cases investor activism is also motivated by economies of scale.  
 
According to Gillan and Starks (2007) institutional investors in the US are today the 
most important category of shareholders, holding more than 60% of US equities in 
                                                 
32 Information disclosed to the authors.  
 11
2005 with respect to 10% in 1953 (see Table 20). As for the EU from Table 2 we 
observe that institutional investors share holdings vary from 25% in Italy to 80% in 
the UK and the Netherlands, with such countries as Germany and France in 
between with respectively 29% and 59%. Rothberg and Lilien (2006) estimate that 
in 2004 mutual funds held about 24% of US equities.  
 
3.4 Shareholder presence at general meetings in the EU and the US 
In the absence of systematic data of shareholder voting rates, the sample analysed 
by PIRC (2007), p. 10 ss. shows average voting levels in France, Germany, Spain 
and Italy varying (Table 9) from 36% in the Netherlands and about 50% (Germany 
and Italy) to about 60% in the UK and Spain with France in between.  As for 
variance, while in the UK levels of voting turnout below 30% are increasingly 
regarded as the exception, in France average figures disguise wide variations in 
turnout among companies, resulting from differing share structure. In particular, in 
the UK the percentage of voting shareholders has been constantly increasing over 
the last ten years, with an increase from 39% in 1996 to 60% in 2006. Finally, 
minority shareholder participation in Italy seems to be very low, with a particularly 
high proportion of shares represented at shareholders’ meeting held by strategic 
shareholders, compared to other European countries. The latter point is also 
confirmed by other sources. According to Consob (2007), the average presence at 
shareholder meetings of small shareholders (shareholders holding less than 2% of 
total voting shares among whom there are mainly institutional investors) in 2006 
was just of 2.5 percentage points. Such data do not include the Italian cooperative 
listed banks (banche popolari) which are characterised by voting rights ceilings (the 
principle one shareholder – one vote), restrictions to proxy voting and ownership 
ceilings. The total shareholder presence at the general meetings in such cases 
seems to be very low, as low as 3% of total shareholders.33  
 
As for the US, Table 9 shows that shareholder presence is high (87%). The reasons 
for such high voting record seem to lie in the first place in the widespread recourse 
to proxy voting by the widely dispersed shareholder base and in some fundamental 
choices made by State legislators in the US such as the fact that the record owner 
of the shares is entitled to vote the shares held even when the person holds the 
stock in a fiduciary capacity.34 According to PIRC (2007), for the 2006 period voting 
turnout for the S&P 500 compqnies would fall from 87.4% to 74.8% if broker votes 
were not considered. The lower voting rates in the EU seem to depend on the 
existence of legal obstacles to national and cross-border proxy voting (see below ch. 
III), to the separation of ownership and control (ch. IV) to the presence of dominant 
shareholder groups (ch. V) and of conflicts of interest (ch. VI). 
 
3.5 Disclosure of Institutional investors' voting policies and voting record in 
the EU and the US  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance recommend disclosure by 
institutional investors of their voting policies. In particular, Principle II.F.1 states 
                                                 
33 http://www.senato.it/ulivo/interviste/070628_2.htm  
34 According to Anabtawi and Stout (2008), p. 34, as much as 85% of exchange-traded securities are held by 
brokers. However, Kahan and Rock (2007a), p. 5, also observe that the consequence of such a system is that 
beneficial owners who want to express their vote personally are obliged to do so by requesting to be appointed 
as proxy agent of their brokers/banks. According to the authors, this produces a series of inefficiencies in the 
voting process in the form of, among other things, votes not counted, double counting, impossibility of providing 
complete vote verification. The authors suggest to simplify the voting chain by giving direct voting right to the 
beneficial owners according to the proposal made in 2004 by Georgeson and the Business Roundtable. 
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that "Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their 
overall corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, 
including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their 
voting rights."35  
In the US, since 2003 institutional investors are required to disclose not just their 
voting policies but also their voting record.36 Such requirement was introduced after 
the initiatives undertaken by **  The ratio was to increase the confidence of savers 
in the management exercised by institutional investors, including their activism in 
the use of their shareholders rights.  
 
In the EU, the action plan on corporate governance and corporate law adopted by 
the European Commission in 2003 contains a reference to the fact that institutional 
investors should be obliged, among other things, to disclose their policy with 
respect to the exercise of voting rights in companies in which they invest.37  
 
However, such position has not resulted as yet in a mandatory requirement by any 
EU Member State. In the UK, the Company Act of 2006 grants reserve powers to the 
Secretary of State to enforce public disclosure of institutional investors’ voting 
record. According to PIRC (2007), p. 7-8, the debate at the moment focuses on 
whether the enactment of such disclosure requirements would be too costly for 
institutional investors. Estimates provided by PIRC range such costs between 
£ 1,000 and £ 1,500 per institutional investor per year, and such costs seem to be 
incremental upon investors keeping electronic records of their voting, something 
which is already recommended in the UK by the Myners Principles (Myners 2007).  
 
Waiting for mandatory voting record disclosure at EU level or EU Member-State 
lavel, for the moment a few institutional investors provide full disclosure of their 
voting record on their website (PIRC 2007, p. 8). 
 
3.6 The effectiveness of institutional investor activism 
 
The effectiveness of institutional investor activism is the subject of an important 
debate. As observed above, in the US such activism has been mainly conducted 
through precatory, that is not binding for the company management, shareholder 
resolutions. Nevertheless, as observed by Gordon (2008),38 managements are never 
happy to reject a recommendation that has substantial shareholder support. A first 
conclusion seems to be that already the new wave of investor activism in the 1980s 
has had the result of persuading management in the US to dialogue with company 
shareholders.39 Examining empirical evidence, Gillan and Starks (2000) and (2007) 
and Georgeson (2005) report a significant number of corporate governance 
proposals submitted in 1987-1994 and in 2001-2005 aimed at removing poison 
pills, classified boards, and supermajority anti-takeover amendments from 
                                                 
35 OECD (2004). 
36 The decision was adopted by the SEC on 23 January 2003 and took effect in July 2003. In particular, SEC Rule 
30b1-4 (Report of Proxy Voting Record) provides that every registered management investment company, other 
than a small business investment company, shall file an annual report not later than August 31 of each year, 
containing the registrant's proxy voting record for the most recent twelve-month period ended June 30. See 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm  
37 European Commission (2003a), p. 13. The action plan indicates such a measure to be adopted through a 
Directive to be adopted by 2008. At the moment (April 2008), the Commission has not yet announced any 
legislative proposal in this respect. It is also interesting to notice that on 25 February 2008 the European 
Parliament held an open hearing on the transparency of institutional investors.  
38 P. 6. 
39 Gillan and Starks (2007), p. 11. See the same article for a survey of the studies on the effectiveness of investor 
activism on companies' financial performance. 
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corporate charters, with an increase in the second period considered in proposals 
on executive compensation and a decrease in importance of cumulative boards40 
and staggered boards. As for the sponsors of corporate governance proposals, from 
the same authors we observe a significant decrease over the period considered of 
proposals submitted by individuals and by public pension funds, with a significant 
increase of proposals submitted by union funds. In this last respect Gillan and 
Starks (2007) observe that union funds and public pension funds seem to share the 
same agenda, with labour activism acting as a model for any large institutional 
investor. According to Capital International, over the last ten years or more, unions 
have increasingly worked to promote governance reforms based on the widely 
adopted position that companies executing good governance generally create better 
value for shareholders.41 This does not necessarily mean that there has been a 
decrease in the activism of public pension funds. Making reference to the same data, 
Gillan and Starks (2007) observe a significant increase of votes in support of 
shareholder proposals. The authors attribute such trend to more concerted action 
by institutional investors, to proxy voting advisory firms, and to the public 
disclosure of mutual fund proxy votes.   
 
According to Georgeson (2007b) recent shareholder activism in the US seems to 
have produced some results, in particular encouraging a movement from plurality 
voting towards majority voting. Kahan and Rock (2007a)42 observe that another 
effect of investor activism has been "the more and more closely fought merger votes". 
 
As for the EU, The survey conducted by NAPF (2007) shows a high impact of the 
engagement on investee companies' governance. More than three quarters of the 
sample (30 funds) have seen evidence that their voting and engagement activities 
are delivering specific, identifiable changes in investee companies  
 
As observed by Capital International, 43  activism is most widespread and most 
effective in the more liquid markets, in the first place the US and the UK, in terms 
of its ability of disciplining failing or dysfunctional companies. Such cleavage might 
also run within markets: Santella et al. (2007) find a statistical relationship between 
disclosure of compliance to director independence requirements and company free-
float in Italian non-financial companies. 
 
3.7 Institutional investors and social and environmental issues 
 
In the US, social and environmental issues have been one of the objects of investor 
activism already for a long time. According to Gillan and Starks (2007) the origin of 
socially-minded shareholder activism dates back to 1970, when a US federal court 
decision allowed a shareholder proposal to forbid the sale of napalm by Dow 
Chemical. The authors quote the American Society of Corporate Secretaries 
reporting that already in 1978 out of the 790 shareholder proposals received during 
the 1978 proxy season 179 were devoted to social issues.  
 
Today in the US the Social Investment Forum (SIF) is the US association dedicated 
to integrate economic, environmental, social and governance factors into investment 
decisions. SIF's membership includes more than 500 social investment 
                                                 
40  Boards elected according to cumulative voting allow in some cases minority shareholders to elect 
representatives on the board, though never to cause a change in control of the company: see Clark 1986, p. 361-
6. 
41 Information provided to the authors. 
42 P. 2.  
43 Information provided to the authors. 
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practitioners and institutions, including financial professionals, analysts, portfolio 
managers, banks, mutual funds, researchers, foundations, community development 
organizations, and public educators.44 
 
Georgeson (2007b) identifies as current priorities for social and environmental-
minded investors such issues as political contributions, sustainability reports, 
greenhouse gas emissions, human rights, and labour standards. According to 
Capital International it is on some stakeholder issues such as employee rights or 
environmental impact that the largest number of shareholder resolutions are seen 
in the US (along with shareholder rights issues such as majority voting for 
directors).45   
 
As for the effectiveness of investor activism in the social responsibility field, 
Campbell, Gillan and Niden (1998) 46  report that governance proposals tend to 
receive less support than social responsibility proposals do. 
 
3.8 Ownership concentration 
 
According to indicators of ownership concentration reported by Enriques and Volpin 
(2007) for the 20 largest listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom and the United States widely held companies are relatively rare even 
among the largest listed companies in Italy while they are very common in the UK 
and the US, with Germany and France in between. Second, with the exception of 
the UK (where it is absent), family control is quite widespread even among the 
largest corporations. Third, pyramids are frequent in continental Europe and totally 
absent in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, looking at the median fraction of 
votes owned by the largest shareholder across all listed companies, ownership 
appears very concentrated in Germany and Italy, and diffused in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, with France falling in between. Finally, in continental Europe ownership 
is largely concentrated in the hands of a small number of wealthy families (see 
Table 7).   
 
Bianchi et al. (2005) provide data on ownership concentration of listed companies 
across 16 European countries (including 14 EU Member States) with reference to 
the percentage of total share capital owned by small shareholders (the so called free 
float). They show that while the general average free float across all the countries 
considered is about 90%, there are significant differences across in Italy the average 
free float is less than 60% against about 90% in the UK and Ireland, more than 70% 
in the Scandinavian countries and about 66% in Germany. (Table 8). 
 
IV. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO PROXY VOTING47 
As observed by Gordon (2008),48 "Given the large number of shareholders in most 
public corporations, it is unfeasible for the shareholders to assemble in a physical 
space for the vote; yet the validity of the vote requires a large turnout, if only to 
satisfy quorum requirements. The practical solution is the corporation's solicitation 
of 'proxies' that designate corporate agents to vote on the shareholder's behalf". 
                                                 
44 http://www.socialinvest.org  
45 Information disclosed to the authors. 
46 Quoted by Gillan and Starks (2007).  
47 Unless differently specified data provided in this paragraph come from answers to the questionnaire distributed 
by the European Commission available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/comm_native_sec_2006_0181_en.pdf  
48 P. 5. 
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In the EU the Shareholder Rights Directive was adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament in July 2007.49 The Directive aims to reduce in the first place 
the costs of national and cross-border proxy voting. Beneficiaries are expected to be 
in the first place institutional investors. The Directive consists of a series of 
measures aimed at removing several legal obstacles to voting at a distance, in the 
first place through the recourse of proxies. The Directive introduces minimum 
standards to ensure that shareholders of companies whose shares are traded on a 
regulated market have a timely access to the relevant information ahead of the 
general meeting (GM) and simple means to vote at a distance. It also abolishes 
share blocking and introduces minimum standards for the rights to ask questions, 
put items on the GM agenda and table resolutions. More in detail, the Directive 
features the following key provisions: minimum notice period of 21 days for most 
GMs, which can be reduced to 14 days where shareholders can vote by electronic 
means and the general meeting agrees to the shortened convocation period; Internet 
publication of the convocation and of the documents to be submitted to the GM at 
least 21 days before the GM; abolition of share blocking and introduction of a 
record date in all Member States which may not be more than 30 days before the 
GM; abolition of obstacles on electronic participation to the GM, including 
electronic voting; right to ask questions and obligation on the part of the company 
to answer questions; abolition of existing constraints on the eligibility of people to 
act as proxy holder and of excessive formal requirements for the appointment of the 
proxy holder; disclosure of the voting results on the issuer's internet site. The 
Directive was adopted in July 2006 by the Council and the Parliament and it is 
supposed to be adopted by the 27 EU Member States by July 2009. 
Proxy voting and re-registration requirements  
Concerning the specific obstacles observed before the adoption of the Directive, in 
the first place several constraints at present make proxy voting unduly cumbersome 
in some Member States. These limitations relate mainly to the persons that may be 
appointed as a proxy, the number of proxy appointments which any one proxy may 
hold or the formal requirements for a valid appointment of proxies. As for the formal 
requirements to be fulfilled, Manifest (2007) stresses that obtaining and submitting 
powers of attorney is a time-consuming and expensive process. In particular, the 
need to renew the power of attorney on a regular basis (e.g. annually or for every 
meeting) is considered to be a serious deterrent to voting, because it is costly and it 
takes a large amount of time and resources, especially in the markets where 
investors do not routinely vote. 
 
Waiting for the adoption of the Directive, the regulation in place in countries such 
as Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Portugal and Finland require setting up 
notarised powers of attorney for the shareholder to empower the sub-custodian to 
represent it and to vote at the GM. Hermes stresses that such costs are so 
important that they might discourage even small funds (not just small individual 
shareholders) from voting. On the other hand, as stressed by DAM, such countries 
as Germany, The Netherlands and France allow voting through a post-oriented 
proxy appointed by the issuer and the votes can be sent over through specific voting 
instruction forms/internet that allow the ultimate investor to vote in absentia and 
to limit his administrative and travel expenses. 
                                                 
49 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies. The EU Member States have two years to implement the Directive in 
their national laws. The Directive is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexa_en.htm  
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As shown in European Commission (2006), Annex 3, question 9, differences also 
concern the methods to appoint proxies, the identity of proxies, the number of 
shareholders who may be represented by the same person, and the power of proxies 
at GMs. 
 
Manifest (2007) observes that, among the other cumbersome requirements for 
proxy-voting which have been addressed by the Shareholders' Rights Directive, an 
important role is played by the re-registration of shares. According to such 
requirement, shares have to be registered from nominee accounts into temporary 
accounts registered in a beneficial owner's name. this is considered to be a major 
disincentive to voting.  
 
Share blocking 
Although some Member States have taken steps to reform the law in this area, the 
practice of share blocking, i.e., the obligation to deposit or block shares for a few 
days before the General Meeting to be able to vote, can still be found in several EU 
jurisdictions before the adoption of the Directive. As it can be seen in European 
Commission (2006), Annex 3, question 9, in some Member States the practice is 
mandatory and the blocking time varies between 3 and 7 days before the date set 
for the GM; in other jurisdictions (e.g., Austria, Italy, Netherlands, Spain) articles of 
association may require that shareholders have to deposit their shares. The reason 
why share blocking facilities exist is to ensure that those who show up to vote at 
general meetings are actually shareholders on the day of the vote. However, share 
blocking is very costly for shareholders as it prevents them from negotiating shares 
up to weeks in advance to the general meeting. 
Share blocking is considered by the vast majority of institutional investors as one of 
the greatest obstacles to voting. Indeed, it appears that many institutional investors 
will choose not to vote rather than be prevented from selling their shares at any 
time. Voting is often considered as not being worth the financial risk associated 
with the immobilisation of shares. According to Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), it is fairly common practice for clients to maintain a standing instruction of 
‘no action’ – or not voting – in markets that practice share blocking.   
 
This circumstance is confirmed also by ISS 50  which adds that its clients 
(institutional investors and global custodian banks) show much greater likelihood to 
vote in markets which do (table 4) and by Hermes according to which voting is an 
area where flexibility is detrimental, as the existence of a multitude of differing 
statutory provisions de facto creates confusion and induces custodians to 
implement a minimum common denominator.51 (see table 5 and 6).  
 
4.1. The remaining legal obstacles in the EU: complexity of cross-border 
voting   
                                                 
50  “Much confusion persists with regard to share blocking in the mind of the institutional voter, given that 
blocking regulations have changed, and continue to do so, in several blocking markets.  Uncertainty over whether 
a market practices a ‘hard’ block (liquidity is frozen) or ‘soft’ block (shares may still trade) is common, as is 
uncertainty over whether or not shares may be unblocked once they have been blocked prior to a meeting 
(France, yes; Greece, no).” 
51 Moreover, the existence of quorum requirements – which per se cannot be considered to be a problem – might 
de facto extend the blocking period considerably. Indeed, in some countries shares shall be blocked 5 days ahead 
of the date fixed for the first call of the general meting (“GM”) and remain blocked till the day after the GM, 
which might be held on second or even third call, with a total blocking period that can reach 30 days. Given that 
it cannot be foreseen with certainty whether the GM will go on second or third call, the uncertainty over the 
length of the whole blocking period acts as a further discouragement to investors. 
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Investors in European listed companies face particular problems if they reside in 
countries other than where the company is registered. Nowadays, investors typically 
hold their shares in securities holding systems through accounts with securities 
intermediaries, who, in turn, hold accounts with other securities intermediaries and 
central securities depositories in other jurisdictions. These cross-border chains of 
intermediaries cause particular problems in the process of communicating with - 
and actual voting by - such shareholders. 
Because of the existence of cross-border chains of intermediaries, cross-border 
voting usually requires the recourse to global custodian banks (or their proxy 
vendors), who in turn must engage proxy-related services from its network of local 
market sub custodians. Resulting local fees are typically passed through the global 
custodian to the underlying institutional voter or beneficial owner. Moreover, many 
local markets have specific voting requirements that incur additional fees. 
According to Manifest (2007), the chain approach used to vote shares in European 
companies is a major source of complexity in the proxy voting process; it is time-
consuming and prone to errors as a result of the large number of different 
participants. On the other hand, Manifest stresses that full audit trails are not 
available in any European market, so that in the chain approach to voting, there is 
no process that would enable a voting service provider to provide an institutional 
investor with the feedback that the votes reached the issuer. 
 
4.2 Obstacles to proxy voting in the US 
Most of the impediments to vote by proxy at shareholder meetings do not apply in 
the US. As observed by Capital International, 52  US issuers determine voting 
eligibility using a record date and distribute comprehensive information to 
shareholders well in advance of the meeting, and shareholders are also allowed to 
vote until the day prior to the meeting date by paper or electronic means, without 
the need to attend or send a representative to meetings in order to exercise their 
rights. The Proxy distribution business is effectively monopolised by one company, 
Broadridge,53 that distributes materials and collects votes on behalf of issuers.  
 
On the other hand, US shareholders' vote seems to have a more limited reach than 
in the EU. As we have seen above, the monitoring model assumes that directors 
always act according to the shareholders' interests and that shareholders should 
have the possibility to monitor directors. However in the US shareholders have less 
power to direct board directors than in the EU. According to Bebchuck the 
“franchise”, i.e. the sovereign power of shareholders is "an illusion."54  
 
In the US system shareholders are allowed to vote in a specified and rather 
restricted set of circumstances. Shareholders are allowed to vote 55  mainly on 
director election, mergers and other extraordinary transactions, and in some cases 
on director self dealing transactions and executive compensation.56 The conclusion 
is that in the US shareholders who wish to influence management voting decisions 
must do so mainly through their vote for the board of directors. As observed by 
                                                 
52 Information disclosed to the authors. 
53 www.broadridge.com  
54 Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 7. 
55 By State law, tax law, and stock exchange rules. 
56 See Kahan and Rock (2007a), p. 4 and Clark (1986), section 3.1.1. 
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Kahan and Rock (2007a), more and more director elections have become central 
also in takeover contest:57  
 
4.2.1 The role of the SEC in restricting the effectiveness of shareholder proxy 
vote 
 
An important role in the definition of shareholder voting rights in the US falls on the 
SEC. In particular, the Security Exchange Act, among other things, gives the SEC 
the authority to discipline the modalities of shareholder access to proxy voting.58  
 
A prudent stance of the Sec vis-à-vis shareholder voting rights is deemed by 
Georgeson (2007b) evident in the case of the NYSE proposal to amend its Rule 452. 
NYSE Rule 452 allows brokers 59  to vote on certain “routine” proposals if the 
beneficial owner of the stock has not provided voting instructions to the broker at 
least 10 days before a scheduled meeting. The NYSE has amended Rule 452 a 
number of times since its adoption in 1937, and the rule identifies a number of 
items that are considered “non-routine” so as not allow the broker to vote on any 
proposal that substantially affects the rights of shareholders. The proposal, filed on 
24 October 2006, subject to approval by the SEC, provides that the election of 
directors be considered as "non-routine" for all shareholder meetings held on or 
after Jan. 1, 2008.60 According to Georgeson (2007b), the SEC has been "not so 
swift" in approving NYSE rule modifications.61   
 
The central point of the debate lies today in the way the SEC has made use of its 
power to give shareholders access to the issuer's proxy statement, particularly in 
connection with the nomination of directors.62  Over time the SEC has maintained 
                                                 
57 Kahan and Rock (2007a), p. 2: "Delaware law, by upholding the poison pill, has channelled the decision into 
the annual meeting. The prevailing mode of hostile acquisitions has become a bid coupled with a proxy contest so 
as to replace the directors and remove the poison pill." 
58  See http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 : "The Securities Exchange Act also governs the 
disclosure in materials used to solicit shareholders' votes in annual or special meetings held for the election of 
directors and the approval of other corporate action. This information, contained in proxy materials, must be filed 
with the Commission in advance of any solicitation to ensure compliance with the disclosure rules. Solicitations, 
whether by management or shareholder groups, must disclose all important facts concerning the issues on which 
holders are asked to vote." The text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf  
59 As reported by Kahan and Rock (2007a), p. 9-10, in the US brokers, together with banks, act as custodians on 
behalf of their beneficial owners. Brokers and banks hold the shares through accounts at the Depository Trust 
Company. 
60 http://www.nyse.com/press/1161166307645.html  
61 Among the other matters that the current NYSE Rule 452 considers routine is an uncontested" election of a 
company’s board of directors. Rule 452.11(2) defines a "contest" as a matter that "is the subject of a counter-
solicitation, or is part of a proposal made by a stockholder which is being opposed by management." According to 
Black (1990), p. 560-61, "under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, stock brokers who hold shares in street 
name for their client can vote those shares on routine matters unless the client gives them voting instructions at 
least 10 days before the meeting.  They can’t vote shares if they know of a contest, nor of a merger or other 
matter 'which may affect substantially the rights of privilege of such stock'. Operating under this vague standard, 
the NYSE lists in a weekly bulletin the matters on which member firms may vote client shares. Brokers invariably 
vote client shares promanager....The NYSE staff can be also incredibly ignorant; it has more than once authorized 
a promanager vote despite a well-publicized proxy fight." In April 2005, the NYSE set up a Proxy Working Group 
(the group) to review the proxy voting process. The group has issued in 2006 a report and recommendations 
(NYSE 2006). In light of the importance of the role of directors in corporate governance matters, the group 
believed the election of directors can no longer be considered a “routine” matter, and for this reason brokers 
should not be allowed to vote uninstructed shares for such elections. The group recommended that Rule 452 be 
amended to make voting on directors a non-routine matter.  
62 Gordon (2008), p. 7. 
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that the shareholder proposal63 cannot relate to a particular election of directors,64 
with the effect of "ruling out a low-cost mechanism for a shareholder insurgent to 
reach fellow shareholders in a director election".65 
 
The consequence is that if a shareholder wants to present an alternative list of 
directors, she has to put in place a proxy (shareholder) solicitation at her own 
expenses.66 
 
As reported by Anabtawi and Stout (2008)67 the SEC recently solicited comments on 
a profound rule change that would have allowed a dissident shareholder holding at 
least 5% of outstanding equity to propose a bylaw change that would allow the 
dissident to include its own director nominees in the company’s proxy solicitation 
materials. However, the SEC eventually decided not to adopt this version of the rule.  
 
As stressed by Gordon (2008),68 having access to the issuer's proxy statement does 
not just mean important cost savings. It also means that the shareholder proponent 
is not subject to the disclosure obligations of a party who is formally soliciting 
proxies. Moreover, the ownership requirements to make a shareholder proposal are 
low, in some cases as little as 2000 USD in shares held for one year. 
 
As for the justification of such a position on the part of the SEC, one possibility is 
that the SEC wants to prevent an ever-present threat of a director election contest 
which would disrupt company management.69 Another reason has recently been 
spelled out by directly by the SEC  
 
According to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, the shareholder base in the US is 
made of diffuse share ownership and a "very large retail component", something 
which explains why the US regulators tend to focus on auditing standards and 
internal controls as a first measure of shareholder protection against possible 
managerial abuses.70  
 
However, as it can be seen from Table 20, in the US more than 60% of total shares 
are today held by institutional investors. As observed by Black (1990)71 and Gordon 
(2008),72 instead of millions of dispersed retail investors, the US public companies 
are increasingly controlled by hundreds or thousands of financial intermediaries. 
Such institutional actors are able to coordinate their voting rights at much lower 
cost. 
 
Finally and perhaps contradictorily, as observed by Gordon (2008), the SEC at the 
same time also acknowledges the need "to strengthen the proxy rules to better 
                                                 
63 SEC rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, allows security holders to have their own proposals for action at 
a forthcoming shareholder meeting included in the management's proxy statement at the company's expenses. 
See Clark (1986), p. 371-3. 
64 Security Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8), permits a company to omit from its proxy materials any proposal that 
"relates to an election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body." 
65 Gordon (2008), p. 7. 
66 SEC rule 14a-7, see Clark (1986), p. 370-1. 
67 P. 34. 
68 P. 5-6. 
69 Gordon (2008), p. 7. 
70 ECGI (2007).  
71 P. 567. 
72 P. 4.  
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vindicate the fundamental state law rights of shareholders to elect directors" by 
promising to reopen the discussion in 2008.73 
 
4.2.2 Recent easing of SEC restrictions on shareholder proxy voting 
Notwithstanding its prudence vis-à-vis shareholder voting rights, the SEC in recent 
times the SEC has eased certain restrictions to voting rights, or rather to giving 
shareholders access to the agenda of shareholder meetings. Apart from the 
evolution of SEC regulatory approach concerning consultation among institutional 
investors (see below par 5.2.5), the recent introduction by the SEC of notice and 
access to proxy materials on the Internet might reduce in the short term 
coordination costs among institutional investors to present proxy solicitations.74 
According to Georgeson (2007b), the interest of this innovation concerns mainly 
voting in companies with a large institutional shareholder base. The author also 
signals that the switch to majority voting and the introduction of the Notice and 
Access rule might determine in the short term complications in the process of 
solicitation.  
 
4.3. Shareholder voting rights in the EU and the US 
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, in the US access to proxy voting for 
institutional investors has been relatively easier compared to the EU. Second, the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive which is supposed to be adopted by the EU Member 
States by July 2009, should remove a significant part of the legal obstacles to proxy 
voting in the EU. We have also seen that in the US the effectiveness of shareholder 
voting is limited by State legislation and SEC regulation. Moreover, in several 
important respects the US corporate law system restricts shareholder power 
compared to EU Member States. In particular, as observed by Bebchuk (2005, p. 
836), in the US all major corporate decisions must be initiated by the board. The 
only way for shareholders to introduce a new corporate decision is by rejecting 
incumbent directors with a team that is expected to make such a change. As it can 
be seen from Table 25, in the US amendments to corporate charters, approvals of 
mergers and sale of company assets can only be done through board initiative, 
differently from what happens in the UK, Italy, France and Germany. Decision on 
dividend distribution in the US belongs exclusively to the board, something which 
happens in Germany, in Italy (but only in case of very rarely used two-tier boards) 
and which does not happen in the UK. Even for removal of directors the situation is 
less favourable for investors in the US than in the UK, Italy, and France, where 
shareholders can request at any time a vote.  
 
The conclusion is that national legislation in the EU seems to give shareholders 
more voting power. Ferrarini (2005, p. 22-3) observes that already in 1998 the 
Italian legislator strengthened the powers and responsibilities of the board of 
auditors (collegio sindacale) so as to make it functionally similar to an audit 
committee made up of non-executive directors. The legislator also gave 5% of 
shareholders the power to sue directors for damages caused to the company. A very 
important innovation was also the introduction, as observed by Bianchi and 
Enriques (2001), of a blocking minority of 25% of voting rights.  
 
Finally, as observed by Ferrarini (2005), it is also important to take into account the 
quality of law enforcement. La Porta et al. (2003) find a low level of private and 
public enforcement of securities laws in Italy and France, something which is 
confirmed for Italy by Ferrarini (2005, p. 26-7). 
                                                 
73 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-246.htm  
74 Gordon (2008), p. 12ss 
 21
 
V CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
In this section we examine whether conflicts of interest might limit institutional 
investors’ activism at the expenses of institutional investors’ clients.  
 
As observed by Gillan and Starks (2007),75 institutional investors "may be reluctant 
to undertake activism against other corporations, particularly those with which the 
sponsoring company does business. Because of business relations with the 
corporation, some institutional investors may feel compelled to vote with 
management even though such behaviour runs contrary to their fiduciary 
interests." The problem is potentially more important the more diversified the 
interests of the investor (Rothberg and Lilien 2006, p. 160). According to Kahan and 
Rock (2007b, p. 24-6), in the US mutual funds affiliated with a financial institution 
may be reluctant to amtagonize present or future clients of their parent company, 
while for large unaffiliated funds the management of corporate pension plans are an 
important source of revenues. The authors also observe that fund management 
companies only profit modestly from activism due to their portfolio diversification, 
so that even modest conflicts of interest might dissuade them from pursuing an 
activist strategy. As for pension funds, sources of conflicts of interest stem from 
their trustees being elected from politicians and being tempted to pursue political 
ends, rather than maximization of investment returns. The latter point might also 
hold in the EU. For instance the Italian legislative framework attributes control on 
the shareholder voting rights for the shares owned by pension funds to trade 
unions (together with employers’ representatives), which might be tempted to make 
use of such rights following their own political agenda rather than the maximization 
of returns.76 Finally, hedge funds seem to be less concerned by conflicts of interest. 
According to Kahan and Rock (2007b, p. 33) most hedge funds are independent 
investment vehicles not affiliated with any other institutions and they do not 
manage companies’ defined contribution plans.  
 
On the empirical side, Romano (1993) investigated whether US public pension 
funds are more effective monitors of management because they vote their own 
shares, while private pension funds usually delegate their voting to external 
managers. However, in her empirical study Romano finds no evidence to support 
this hypothesis. Along the same line, two studies surveyed by Gillan and Starks 
(2007)77 also suggest that funds are no more likely to vote with management at 
client than non-client firms. 
 
As for the EU, there are signs that, at least in some Member States, conflicts of 
interest might discourage institutional investors from voting their portfolio shares. 
De Rossi et al. (2008)78 report that the Italian mutual funds owned by banks and 
insurance companies have about 85% market share. The boards of such funds are 
made mainly of directors who are also executives in the controlling bank or 
insurance company, while the number of independent directors sitting on such 
boards is very low, and sometimes nonexistent. Such potential conflicts of interest 
seem to translate in a low voting turnout by Italian mutual funds. According to 
Consob (2007) the Italian mutual funds have a very low voting turnout at the 
shareholder meetings of their listed portfolio companies. 
                                                 
75 P. 13.  
76 Legislative Decree 5 December 2005, n. 252, (Official Journal 13 December 2005 n. 289 S.O. n. 200), art. 8c). 
the Decree is available at: http://www.covip.it/documenti/PDF/LeggiDecreti/Decreto%20252.pdf  
77 P. 24. 
78 P. 23-25. 
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VI. ACTING IN CONCERT 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the economic obstacles to institutional 
investor coordination and to identify the cases in which the legal discipline of acting 
in concert might constitute an obstacle to institutional investor activism.  
 
6.1. Economic obstacles to minority shareholder coordination  
Proxy fights and in general acting in concert are not common and often fail because 
of shareholders’ passivity. The passivity of dispersed shareholders is a tipical 
“collective action” problem in a twofold meaning. First all all, it is possible that 
spending 10 an investor could obtain 20. In this case the collection action problem 
is that each shareholder hopes that other shareholders act on behalf of every 
shareholder. Shareholder activism has the characteristic of a public good. Second, 
for a shareholder it may be rational to behave in a way of apathy bacause she has 
to spend ten dollars to obtain five. But if every one acts, each shareholder would 
obtain twenty. Also in this case there is a problem of collective action because 
activism is a public good. However, the possibility of acting in concert without 
restrictions helps to overcome the collective action problems: in the first case 
because expenses per shareholder are lower; in the second case because there is an 
earning per shareholder. The result is that, as reported by OECD (2007d, p. 3), 
capital markets around the world are increasingly dominated by institutional 
investors that often adopt passive investment strategies. Such trend is also 
encouraged by prudential regulation that limits the share of equity held in a 
company by some institutional investors. In this respect, Bianchi and Enriques 
(2001)79 observe that the only way for institutional investors that invest in the index 
is to coordinate their efforts. However, Kahan and Rock (2007b, p. 15-16) observe 
that mutual funds and pension funds are forced by regulatory constraints, portfolio 
diversification and other factors to a “passive” form of activism focused at changes 
in corporate governance rules (instead of specific company decisions) spread over a 
number of companies, and further limited by the fact that shareholder resolutions 
in the US are usually not binding.  
 
Gillan and Starks (2007) survey two studies on investor activism showing that an 
important obstacle to proxy proposals in the US is the difficulty of persuading other 
institutions to agree on unified proxy strategies.80  
 
Sometimes a coalition of istitutional investors can go as far as to publicly undertake 
to remove a board of directors. One such case was widely covered by the press: it 
was the case of the UK Tate company. Tate management was accused to manage 
the company in an inefficient way.  The chief executive and founder of the company 
owned a 23% block and believed that he could win a vote at a special shareholders’ 
meeting. Norwich Union, which held 5% of Tate’s share intevened in the dispute 
and after negoziations chief executive was substituted by a manager closely 
associated with the former chief executive. Norwich Union's chief investment officer 
was also the chairman of the Institutional Shareholders’s Committee. He quickly 
made a coalition with two othe institutional investors, but one soon dropped out. 
Norwich Union assembled proxies from 40% of Tate’s shareholders, called an 
emergency meeting, and voted the board out of office. The interesting aspect is that 
Norwich Union and the other institutional investor who joined the action found 
themselves with a 60,000-pound bill for solicitors’ service. No other shareholder 
                                                 
79 P. 10. 
80 P. 14. 
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accepted to share the expenses. It was a tipical case of free riding.81 From the 
example it emerges that in order to have successful activism the private benefits 
must be higher than the benefit appropriated by the free riders, which means that 
coordination costs increase the cost of activism and reduce the number of proxy 
campaigns. The answer seems to be that shareholder activists should have more 
important stakes in the companies in which they are active. Hedge funds are not 
constrained in their shareholding levels by regulation. Georgeson (2007b) reports 
an increase in the number of proxy fights (proxy contests) in the US in the last ten 
years and attributes such increase mainly to hedge funds. Evidence surveyed by 
Gillan and Starks (2007)82 also reports a sharp increase in proxy contests between 
2003 and 2005 attributable mostly to hedge funds. Kahan and Rock (2007b) 
observe a complementarity between hedge funds and “traditional” institutional 
investors who lack the means to initiate proxy fights and other activist practices but 
who can support them.83 Such activism, which is directed mainly at short-term 
shareholder value enhancement (M&A included), seems to have produced also more 
long-term effects in persuading companies to give up strong takeover defense 
profiles. According to OECD (2007d, p. 1), activist hedge funds and private equity 
firms could help strengthen corporate governance practices by increasing the 
number of investors that have the incentive to make active and informed use of 
their shareholder rights. The existence of a significant interest on the part of such 
investors allows them to establish alliances with other hedge funds (the "wolf-pack 
approach") so as to seek the active free riding by pension funds and mutual funds 
through several means, for instance contacts with proxy advisory firms (see below 
chapter 9.1) and institutional road shows. For the moment the success rate of such 
investors is quite impressive (OECD 2007d, p. 5), although the proliferation of 
activist hedge funds might determine in the near future difficulties in ensuring for 
such investors above-average returns (Georgeson 2007b). The consequence might 
be an increase in the hedge fund effort to sustain short term gains by creating more 
fights.  
 
The collective action problem has an impact equally in the US and in Europe, 
although as we have seen hedge funds seem for some reason to be less active in the 
EU than in the US. Another economic obstacle to shareholder activism is 
represented by the existence of strong controlling shareholder blocks. The problem 
seems to be particularly important in continental Europe, where, as we have seen 
above (par. 3.8) controlling blocks and in general the weight of the first shareholder 
is particularly relevant.  
 
6.2. Legal obstacles to acting in concert in the EU and the US 
 
As observed by OECD (2007a, p. 57-9), many investors, including hedge funds, 
sometimes engage in parallel behaviour, mimicking each other’s investment 
decisions and use of their shareholder rights. While according to the OECD such 
behaviour is not only not reprehensible but is part of an institutional investor’s 
duty to monitor market developments on behalf of its clients, in some cases 
national legislations in the EU and in the US establishes limits to concerted 
shareholder action.  
 
                                                 
81 Bernard S. Black and John Coffee, Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited Regulatuion, 
92 Mich. L. Rev. 1999, 2042-2043 ( 1994).  
82 P. 31. 
83 The authors also observe that besides the possibility to concentrate their assets on specific targets, hedge 
funds have further advantages with respect to “traditional” institutional investors such as their charging 
significant incentive fees and aiming at hig absolute returns instead of returns relative to a benchmark. 
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In the EU one of the core provisions of the Takover Directive84 is the so-called 
mandatory bid rule (MBR). It requires a person or persons acting in concert who 
acquire a certain percentage of a company's voting rights giving them control of that 
company to make a full takeover bid for all remaining shares at an equitable price. 
This obligation aims at protecting the interest of minority shareholders and provides 
them with a right to leave the company on fair terms once the controlling 
shareholders change.85  
 
The Directive defines acting in concert (art. 2.1.d)86 as persons cooperating with the 
offeror or the offeree on the basis of an agreement aimed at either acquiring control 
of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful outcome of a bid. Further to 
the presumption of the Directive that the acquisition of a certain percentage of 
voting rights (defined usually at 30% at national level) 87  confers control, the 
Directive does not provide a unified definition for the concept of control which in 
turn is used  by the Directive for the definition of acting in concert. Such a detailed 
definition is then provided by Member States. As a consequence, given the absence 
in the Directive of predetermined criteria for distinguishing acting in concert from 
corporate governance activism, different rules and standards apply which might 
lead to legal uncertainty. Hermes88 remarks that the regulations of some Members 
State currently do not differentiate control-seeking actions from the co-operation of 
institutional investors aiming at developing a shared message to companies. 
Hermes estimates that the lack of clarity implies costs representing 3-27% of the 
total costs for active ownership activities 
 
6.2.1 Germany 
The German takeover act (the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, or 
Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, "WpÜG") was adopted in 2001 by the 
German Parliament and is in force since January 1st 2002.  
 
The Acting in concert under the terms of the Takeover Act of 2002 
 
Among other things, the law contains a provision on the acting in concert. 
According to §30 sec. 2 of the German Takeover Law (Wertpapierubernahmegesetz - 
WpÜG), the obligation of launching a mandatory offer applies as well to the persons 
with whom the shareholder trespassing the 30% threshold coordinates his voting 
conduct. The provision in question deems shareholders to be acting in concert 
whenever they coordinate "in any other way". Two jurisprudential rulings on the 
subject have clarified the meaning of the law with respect to the acting in concert.  
 
In 2004 a ruling from a regional German Appeal Court provided an interpretation 
for the meaning of the "any other way" formulation.89 The decision was based on 
two central aspects. On the one hand the court stated that the main feature of 
                                                 
84  Directive 2004/25/EC of 21.04.2004 on takeover bids. The text of the Directive is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm#legislation  
85 On the debate about the effectiveness of the so-called Mandatory Bud Rule in protecting minority shareholders 
see Enriques (2004) and Sepe (2007).  
86 Art. 2.1.d: "persons acting in concert» shall mean natural or legal persons who cooperate with the offeror or 
the offeree company on the basis of an agreement, either express or tacit, either oral or written, aimed either at 
acquiring control of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful outcome of a bid;" 
87 See the report published by the European Commission in February 2007 on the adoption of the Directive by EU 
Member States at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm#legislation  
88 Answering to the questionnaire distributed by European Commission (2006). 
89 The OLG Frankfurt, in its decision, rejected the assumption of acting in concert (and therefore the triggering of 
a mandatory offer) against two shareholders tied to each other  by a strategy paper concerning the rehabilitation 
of the company in which  they reached a holding of 40% in share capital.   
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acting in concert is the intentional cooperation of the shareholders with the aim of a 
continuous and co-ordinated use of voting rights. Moreover, such coordination has 
to be part of a sustained and continued connection. The second important aspect of 
the decision lies in the fact that the Court required the German financial 
supervising Authority (BAFin) to prove the existence of such an agreement against 
the involved shareholders in the relevant case. A mere suspicion of an agreement is 
not sufficient.  
 
In September 2006 the highest German court, the Bundesgerichtshof, provided an 
interpretation of the acting in concert as relating only the coordination of the 
shareholders at the general meeting (GM) itself.90  On the other hand, elections 
conducted in the supervisory board are not subject to section 30, par. 2 of the 
WpÜG. The judges argued that supervisory board members are obliged to serve the 
interests of the company and are neither representatives of the shareholders nor 
subject to any instructions by them.  
 
The meaning of the acting in concert under the terms of the German Takeover Act 
of 2002 according to the interpretation given by the German Courts is then rather 
restricted, since it only covers agreements among shareholders at the GM. Moreover, 
such coordination has to be part of a sustained and continued connection.     
 
Finally, as demonstrated by the case Deutsche Börse AG in 2005, the coordinated 
acquisition of shares by several shareholders is not sufficient evidence under the 
Takeover Act to demonstrate the existence of acting in concert.  
 
The Acting in concert according to the draft amendment to the Takeover Act of 2002 
 
The German Federal Ministry of Finance, mandated by the Federal Government, 
prepared in September 2007 a draft bill called "Risk Limitation Act"91 which is 
supposed to come into force in Spring 2008. The draft legislation contains, among 
other things, an amendment to the Takeover Act of 2002 which enlarges the scope 
of acting in concert, and an amendment to the Securities Trading Act 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, "WpHG")92.   
 
a) The new proposed definition of acting in concert 
 
As for the new proposed definition of acting in concert, the draft legislation intends 
to extend the definition of acting in concert to cover not just the agreements among 
shareholders having as an object the coordinated exercise of voting rights at the GM.  
 
Second, the new proposed law extends the acting in concert also to "coordinated 
conduct" as long as the parties involved "agree to cooperate in a manner that is 
qualified to influence the target company's entrepreneurial direction permanently or 
considerably."93  
 
                                                 
90 II ZR 137/05 of 13 September 2006.  
91 German Ministry of Finance, Referentenentwurf für ein Begrenzung der mit Finanzinvestitionen verbundenen 
Risiken, Bearbeitungsstand: 13.09.2007  
92  The English version of the act is available at: http://www.bafin.de/gesetze/wphg_en.htm#p21 and at: 
http://www.bafin.de/cln_006/nn_721176/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetze/wpueg__en.html?__nnn=true . 
The draft of a Risk Limitation Act which is still under discussion in Parliament is published under 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/brd/2007/0763-07.pdf  
93 Ibidem. The draft law specifies that coordinated conduct “in individual occasions” is exempted. 
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The draft bill provides an exception to this last provision. Agreements having as an 
object the composition of the supervisory board and the appointment of its 
chairperson do not fall within the definition of acting in concert on condition that 
the new members of the board and/or the new chairman do not introduce a new 
entrepreneurial direction to the company.  
 
b) Notification requirements 
Among other things, the Risk Limitation Act also provides 94  new disclosure 
requirements linked to the reaching or the trespassing of the del 10% threshold and 
of any further quantitative threshold provided by §21, 1 del WpHG.95 Under such 
new disclosure requirements the shareholder has to specify the objectives pursued 
through her participation in the company and the origin of the funds used to 
finance the acquisition. Such information must be provided within twenty days 
from the trespassing. Such short delay applies also in case of change in the 
objectives pursued by the shareholder. The draft law specifies a number of items 
that must be covered by the notification, such as the whether the investment serves 
the purpose of implementing strategic objectives or generating trading profits; the 
acquirer intends to obtain further voting rights, by acquisition or otherwise, within 
the next twelve months; the acquirer intends to obtain control within the meaning 
of Section 29 subsection 2 WpÜG,; the acquirer intend to influence the composition 
of any issuer's administrative, management or supervisory bodies; and finally 
whether the acquirer intends to introduce a substantial change in the company's 
capital structure or the dividend policy.  
 
As regards the origin of the funds, the party obliged to notify must indicate the 
respective percentages of own and external funds in the total financing. Moreover, it 
is intendend, although not explicitly stated in the proposed wording of the bill, that 
the acquirer shall also indicate whether it acts independently or jointly with other 
shareholders.  
 
As a consequence of the disclosure requirement, the investor must reveal ex post 
business internals. The requirement to update such information without undue 
delay might even have the consequence that an investor must disclose new 
objectives before having had the opportunity to implement these objectives.  
 
                                                 
94 Draft Risk Limitation Act, art. 1, par. 3.  
95 The version currently in force of the article provides:  
Section 21 Notification requirements applicable to the notifying party 
(1) Any person (the notifying party) whose shareholding in an issuer whose home country is the Federal Republic 
of Germany reaches, exceeds or falls below 3 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent, 
30 percent, 50 percent or 75 percent of the voting rights by purchase, sale or by any other means shall, without 
undue delay, and at the latest within four trading days, notify this to the issuer and simultaneously to the 
Supervisory Authority in compliance with section 22 (1) and (2). In respect of certificates representing shares, the 
notification requirement shall apply exclusively to the holder of the certificates. The notification period set forth in 
sentence 1 begins at the point when the notifying party learns or in consideration of the circumstances must have 
learned that his/her percentage of the voting rights has reached, exceeded or fallen below the above-mentioned 
thresholds. 
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The amendment of Section 28 WpHG96 is to introduce tougher legal consequences 
for violations of statutory notification obligations pursuant to Section 21 WpHG. 
Currently, rights arising from shares, which belong to a party obligated to notify or 
from shares through which voting rights are attributed to this party do not exist for 
the period during which the notification obligations pursuant to Section 21 paras. 1 
or 1a WpHG are not fulfilled. Currently the loss of rights applies only until the point 
when the notification is (subsequently) made. This allows a party obligated to notify 
to acquire further and to make the notification only prior to the shareholders 
meeting in due time so as to avoid any loss of rights at the shareholders meeting. In 
the future the loss of rights "taking into account the amount of voting rights" 
("sofern die Höhe des Stimmrechtsanteils betroffen ist") shall continue to apply for 
six months subsequent to a delayed compliance with the notification obligation if 
the notification was omitted by intent or gross negligence. The burden of proof 
placed on the party obligated to notify will cause considerable legal uncertainty. 
Such loss of rights should not affect financial rights (e.g the entitlement to 
dividends). 
 
6.2.2 France 
The regulation of acting in concert has been introduced into the french legal system 
in 1989. After several amendments, it is now defined by article L233-10 of French 
Commercial Code 97 . According to the mentioned provision, persons who have 
entered into an agreement with a view to buy or sell voting rights or with a view to 
exercise voting rights to implement a policy in relation to a company are deemed to 
be acting in concert. Such an agreement is presumed to exist: between a company, 
the chairman of its board of directors and its general managers or the members of 
its executive board or its partners; 
between a company and the companies it controls within the meaning of Article L. 
233-3; between companies controlled by the same person or persons; between the 
partners in a simplified joint-stock company in relation to the companies it controls. 
Persons acting in concert are jointly and severally bound by the obligations imposed 
on them by the laws and regulations. 
 
The most critical feature of acting in concert as designed by the French legislator 
lies in the difficulty to prove the actual existence of an agreement. Such an 
agreement can either be concluded or supposed. Where an agreement is actually 
concluded, its existence could be proved by means of written evidence. Problems 
arise when no written evidence is available. In such situations, highlighting a series 
of concurring and consistent clues seems to be the only way to be followed in order 
to determine whether an acting in concert occurs or not. In a recent finding, the 
Appeal Court of Versailles (27 June 2007) has stated that the existence of a concert 
agreement can be inferred by a series of "concurring serious and precise elements", 
such as: the consistency of the holding by one of the alleged concerting parties, the 
                                                 
96 This section currently provides that:  
Section 28 Loss of rights 
Voting rights attached to shares held by or attributed to a notifying party pursuant to section 22 (1) sentence 1 
nos. 1 or 2 are not valid during the period for which the notification requirements pursuant to section 21 (1) or 
(1a) have not been met. This does not apply to claims under section 58 (4) and section 271 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), provided that the notification was not deliberately omitted and was made after 
the fact. 
97 The english version of the French Commercial Code is available at 
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32  
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assessed cost of shares acquired by another party, the concomitance of acquisitions, 
prices and amount of the shares that had been bought. 
 
The Law 2006-387 of 31 March 2006, while implementing the Directive 
2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, has introduced a new article in the Commercial 
Code; such new provision (article L233-10-1), consistently with the direction given 
by the Directive, provides for two different forms of acting in concert.  
 
The first form is the concerted action with the bidder, aimed at acquiring control of 
the target company. This hypothesis of acting in concert is not different from the 
one set forth in art. 233-10. Acting in concert will be stated as existent in any case 
in which its basic elements (i.e. the existence of an agreement and the aim of the 
agreement itself) occur jointly. Being the agreement necessarily aimed at acquiring 
voting rights, the goal of acquiring control is pretty much similar to the acting in 
concert as defined by the above mentioned article 233-10. Therefore such first 
hypothesis is not really new and it is probably redundant. 
 
The second hypothesis, provided by art. 233-10-1 of the Code de Commerce, is the 
really new feature of acting in concert, since it introduces for the first time the 
"defensive acting in concert", which is characterised by three peculiarities. As for 
the parties of the agreement, the innovative profile of the provision is represented by 
the fact that also the target company now can be recognized as party to the 
agreement, while in the case of concerted action with the bidder seen above the 
target company is not related in any way to the agreement. It is predictable that 
such a lack of discipline will be covered by courts judgements. Finally, the aim of 
this form of acting in concert is to "frustrate the successful outcome of the bid"; 
that should mean either dissuading the bidder or trying to convince the offeree 
shareholders to sell their shares. As for the actual content of the said expression, it 
is not clear what kind of behaviour should be considered to be covered by the 
provision.  
 
a. The so-called Put up or Shut up Rule 
According to Article 233-32 of its General Regulation, the AMF (the French 
authority of supervision on financial markets), especially when unusual volumes of 
financial instruments of a given issuer are traded and their prices undergo 
significant variations, is entitled to require those who are reasonably deemed to be 
preparing, either alone or acting in concert with others, a takeover bid, to disclose 
their intentions to the market. At this stage, there are different possible scenarios. 
When the reply is positive, and the requested persons disclose an actual intention 
to launch a takeover bid, the AMF fixes a date within which they have to publish a 
document containing all the details of the takeover project, or, where considered by 
the authority to be necessary, to immediately issue an offer. When the 
charateristics of a bid are not communicated or the project of takeover is not issued, 
the concerned subjects are considered as not interested in a takeover; article 233-
35 therefore applies. According to this article, those subjects who have not declared 
their intention to launch a takeover bid, or who actually declared they do not want 
to launch such a bid, are not allowed, during six months after the deadline set by 
the AMF, to deposit an offer98. The investigating power the AMF has been given is a 
potential risk for the activism of investors, as long as some criteria in stating the 
reasonableness we referred above will not be clarified, since even simple rumors  
might be sufficient in order to trigger AMF's (discretional) power. 
                                                 
98 The General Regulation of the AMF, and more specifically the part  which the present paper refers to, is 
available at http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/8004_1.pdf  
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b The so-called 10% Rule 
Another provision which can be potentially interpreted as an obstacle to 
institutional investor activism can be found in the French Code de Commerce99: 
when a shareholder reaches a participation of 10% of the total capital (or voting 
rights), she has to disclose the objectives she foresees to pursue during the twelve 
following months.100 In her declaration, the shareholder has to state, among other 
things : whether she is acting alone or in concert with other shareholders; whether 
she envisages to stop acquiring shares or intends to increase her participation; 
whether she aims at acquiring  the control of the company. The said statement 
must be addressed, within ten trading days, to the company whose shares have 
been acquired as well as to the AMF. 
 
6.2.3 The UK 
The UK legislation seems to be the only one among those examined providing clear 
guidelines for distinguishing acting in concert from corporate governance activism.  
 
As defined by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,101 persons acting in concert 
are persons who, pursuant to an agreement or understanding (whether formal or 
informal), co-operate to obtain or consolidate control of a company or to frustrate 
the successful outcome of an offer for a company. A person and each of its affiliated 
persons will be deemed to be acting in concert with each other. Control in this 
context means 30% of the voting rights in the target company. The Code presumes 
that certain categories of person will be acting in concert unless the contrary is 
shown.102 Under the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR)103 issued by the FSA 
a person will also be an indirect holder of shares held by a third party where they 
agree that they should adopt, by concerted exercise of the voting rights they hold, a 
lasting common policy towards the management of the company in question. 
 
Since 1968, the year of its establishment, the Panel on Takeover and Mergers has 
been given the task to issue and administer the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers and to supervise and regulate takeovers and other matters to which the 
Code applies in accordance with the Rules set out in the Code. The Panel has been 
designated as the supervisory authority to carry out certain regulatory functions in 
relation to takeovers pursuant to the Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC). Its 
statutory functions are set out in and under Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the Companies 
Act 2006.104  
 
The Takeover Panel does not normally regard the action of shareholders voting 
together on a particular resolution as an action which of itself indicates that such 
parties are acting in concert. However, the Panel will normally presume 
                                                 
99  Art L233-7 of the french Code de Commerce, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/./affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006229205&cidTexte=LEGITEXT0000
05634379&dateTexte=20080131&fastPos=1&fastReqId=2116150879&oldAction=rechCodeArticle  
100 Such threshold was originally 20%, and it was lowered to 10% in 1997, see Banque & Droit (1997). 
101 Available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/codesars/DATA/code.pdf 
102 See Goergen and L. Renneboog  (2003), p. 148-9: “Ownership disclosure regulation in the uk does not apply 
only to individuals or companies but also to individuals and companies with voting agreements. Such voting 
agreements consist in obligations or restrictions between shareholders with respect to the use, retention or 
disposal of their stakes. A coalition of shareholders with a voting agreement will be considered by regulatory 
authorities as one single shareholder. This implies, for instance, that if the combined direct and indirect 
shareholdings of a coalition amount to at least 3% disclosure is compulsory. Furthermore, a coalition controlling 
directly or indirectly 30% or more of the equity will be obliged to make a tender offer for all shares outstanding” . 
103 Available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/hb-releases/rel64/rel64dtr.pdf 
104 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf 
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shareholders who requisition or threaten to requisition the consideration of a board 
control-seeking proposal either at an annual general meeting or at an extraordinary 
general meeting, in each case together with their supporters as at the date of the 
requisition or threat, to be acting in concert with each other and with the proposed 
directors. Such parties will be presumed to have come into concert once an 
agreement or understanding is reached between them in respect of a board control-
seeking proposal with the result that subsequent acquisitions of interests in shares 
by any member of the group could give rise to an offer obligation. Moreover, the UK 
has recently changed their interpretation practice in order to encourage 
shareholders to be more active. In case of a common shareholder action aiming at 
changing the board, the Panel had previously taken into account the number of 
board members proposed. If the shareholders wanted to change the majority of 
them, they were deemed to act in concert to acquire control. Now, the most 
important factor is whether the new managers supported by the shareholders are 
linked to them or not: shareholders can propose to change the entire board without 
their action being considered concerted action if the new board members are not 
linked to them.105 
 
6.2.4 Italy  
In Italy the discipline of acting in concert has just been modified by the law that has 
adopted the Takeover Directive.106 The amendment has introduced a fourth new 
case of acting in concert to the three already provided by the law.107  
 
The first three hypothesis of acting in concert are the following: (i) subjects who are 
parties in an agreement, either valid or null, aimed at regulating voting rights at the 
general meetings of listed companies (or general meeting of their holding 
companies); (ii) managers or CEOs of one same company; (iii) subjects who are 
connected with each other by control relationships, either a shareholder and the 
companies he controls (directly or indirectly), or companies controlled by the same 
shareholder. 
 
Whenever one of the said hypothesis occurs, the thresholds set forth in articles 106 
and 108 of TUF (i.e. 30% and 90%, the thresholds respectively triggering the so-
called Mandatory Bid and the Residual Bid) must be calculated by summing the 
shares held by each subject. In such cases each one of the involved parties has the 
obligation to launch a takeover bid. 
As said, the new Legislative Decree has added a fourth hypothesis, which considers 
as acting in concert “those subjects who cooperate to the purpose of acquiring the 
control of the issuing company". It is not entirely clear how such a cooperation is 
                                                 
105 According to note 2 on Rule 9.1 (available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/consultation/RS10.pdf  ) In 
determining whether a proposal is board control-seeking, the Panel will have regard to a number of factors, 
including, in the first place, the relationship between any of the proposed directors and any of the shareholders 
proposing them or their supporters. Relevant factors in this regard will include whether there is or has been any 
prior relationship between any of the activist shareholders, or their supporters, and any of the proposed directors; 
whether there are any agreements, arrangements or understandings between any of the activist shareholders, or 
their supporters, and any of the proposed directors with regard to their proposed appointment; and whether any 
of the proposed directors will be remunerated in any way by any of the activist shareholders, or their supporters, 
as a result of or following their appointment. If, on this analysis, there is no relationship between any of the 
proposed directors and any of the activist shareholders or their supporters, or if any such relationship is 
insignificant, the proposal is not considered to be board control-seeking such that the parties are not presumed to 
be acting in concert. If, however, such a relationship does exist which is not insignificant, the proposal may be 
considered to be board control-seeking. 
106 Legislative Decree 19 November 2007, n. 229, published on the Italian Official Journal (Gazzetta ufficiale) n. 
289 of 13 December 2007. 
107 Legislative Decree n. 58/1998 (Testo Unico della Finanza, or TUF). 
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supposed to be verified, something which might introduce uncertainty for 
institutional investors who want to actively participate in company life without 
acquiring control.  
 
6.2.5 Legal obstacles to acting in concert in the US 
 
In both situations that have been examined, where free riding is a risk, the 
possibiity for Institutional Investors to coordinate their action is very important. But 
the US regulatory framework contains several obstacles that may prevent acting in 
concert. Exchange Act section 13 (d)108 requires any person or group which owns 
more than 5% of a public company’s stock and that decides to act in concert, also 
informally, to file a Schedule 13 (d) containing disclosure about the person or group, 
its ownership, and especially its plans with respect to the company. The matters 
that must be disclosed have been construed in a broad sense. The company 
managers will usually sue the members of the group for misdisclosure of one sort 
on another. 
 
According to Bernard Black “The College Retirement Equities Fund (Cref)  will 
sponsor a poison pill resolution at Company A, and the Wisconsin Investment 
Board will sponsor a similar resolution at Company B, but CREF and Wisconsin 
typycally won’t cosponsor each other’s resolutions if their combined holdings exceed 
5%”.109 
 
In 1992 the SEC amended its rules to allow large shareholders to report their 
holdings on the simpler form 13 (g ). Schedule 13 (g) calls for less information and 
does not need to be filed so promptly and amended so often. But this only in the 
case that the investor wants to be a passive one110. The SEC amendment left 
sceptical John Coffee Jr, who commented: "You can communicate freely, but your 
audience must stay at a distance and not indicate that they agree"111. However, 
other more positive commentators observed that the 1992 reform introduced the 
ten-or fewer-rule, which allows a shareholder to solicit up to ten other shareholders 
without the need of any filing. Also the free-speech-rule allows a shareholder to 
solicit a limited number of shareholders without any required filing, except a copy 
of any written material.112 
 
According to Coffee the problem is in the initial interpretation of the rule 13 (d), 
which requires two shareholders to file when they act as a group “for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities”. The SEC interpreted the rule as 
meaning that “two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of equities securities”. Coffee observes that 
                                                 
108 http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf 
109 Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich, L. Rev  520, 544 (1990)   
110 Schedule 13 (g) is a SEC form used to report a party's ownership of stock that is over 5% of the company. 
Schedule 13G requires less information from the filing party with respect to Schedule 13 (d). Ownership of over 
5% in a publicly-traded stock is considered to be significant ownership, and therefore must be reported to the 
public. To be able to file a 13G instead of a 13D, the party must own between 5% and 20% in the company and 
it must also be clearly understood that the party acquiring the stake in the company does not intend to exert 
control, i.e. is only a passive investor. If these criteria are not met  a 13D must be filed. See INVESTOPEDIA, 
entry Schedule 13 (g) available at http://investopedia.com. 
111 John Coffe, Jr,The SEC and the Institutional Investors: A Half- Time Report, Cardozo L. Rev 847, 881. See also 
Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposal:Impact of the1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J. L. Econ.&ORG. 233 (2000) 
(explaining that liberalization of the proxy rules has not affected shareholder communication practices). 
112 Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, The 
Summer 2007Journal of Corporation 682, 687. 
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the idea of the “voting group” was the creation of the SEC, and he takes sides for its 
abolition. However, Coffee also recognises that the 1992 rule also has a positive 
side: “proxy reform has radically reduced the cost of shareholder’s communications. 
For example, after proxy deregulation, the United Shareholders Association 
estimated that it could target a mailing to a corporation’s 1000 largest shareholders 
for a total cost to it of 5,000 to 10,000$, whereas previously a full scale proxy 
statement would have cost it $ 1 million to prepare and distribute”113. Anabtawi and 
Stout (2008)114 also observe that the 1992 rule also allowed most shareholders to 
make public statements, including speeches, press releases, newspaper 
advertisements, broadcast media, and internet communications, and to coordinate 
with each other and combine their share holdings into larger voting blocks.  
 
The courts have also contributed to making the regulations less severe and thus 
favouring institutional investors and hedge funds in particular. The most important 
development concerns the continual attitude of the courts of refusing to accept that, 
when two investors speak and exchange opinions on their investments in a 
company, this constitutes a clandestine group. For example in one case, Hallwood 
Realty Partners L.P. versus Gotham Partners L.P., the Second Circuit found that 
two parties which had filed a Schedule 13D and one party that had filed a Schedule 
13G did not constitute a group, even though one party was a raider, two had 
bought shares in the same period and all three had discussed their investments. 115 
 
Liability of the Controlling Person. 
Another obstacle to acting in concert in the US is represented by the rules 
contemplating liability of controlling persons. When a group of investors, acting in 
concert, controls the company, shares can be sold only in particular ways that 
involve delay, expense, strict liability for material mistatements. The controlling 
shareholder is also liable for securities law violation. There is an exempion when 
shareholder has acted in good faith. The SEC construes control in a broad way. It is 
quite sure that controlling the nomination of board of directors means controlling 
the company.116 
 
Shareholders who are also creditors (such as banks) face additional risks: the 
debtor can sue claiming improper influence over the businessor his debtor can be 
subordinated. In general a 10% holding should be sufficient to have a controlling 
shareholder if the rest of shares is dispersed.117 
 
Poison Pills 
Another obstacle agaist acting in concert is represented by flip-in poison pills. 
These tools, which are means to defend managers against raiders, work in this way: 
if a shareholder tries to take the control of the company, managers distribute to 
other shareholdes shares at a discount price with respect to market price. In this 
way the stake of the raider is diluted. The risk to have an investment diluted and 
destroyed is a strong deterrent to organize a coalition.118 
 
State anti-takeover statutes   
                                                 
113 John Coffe, Jr,The SEC and the Institutional Investors, supra note .. at 840-841. 
114 P. 28. 
115 Briggs (2007, p. 691). 
116 Black (1990, p. 545). 
117 Black (1990, p. 549). 
118 Black (1990). 
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Several US states have statutes that increase, directly or indirectly, obstacles to 
action in concert of institutional investors. For instance, a first type of statutes 
prohibits mergers and other operations on the part of shareholders who have 
bought a certain amount of shares, generally 10% or 15%. There are, also 
disclosure laws with the same content of Schedule 13 D an 13 G. This means that 
these statutes require certain formalities to institutional investors who do not want 
to be passive while they demand less disclosure to subjects who want to make an 
investment but want to be passive. These statutes tipically deprive investors with 
20% of shares or more of their voting rights, unless other shareholders vote for 
allowing the shareholder to exercise her right to vote. The definition of group that is 
adopted is the one used by the SEC, which includes voting groups.119 
 
6.2.6 Comparison of the national systems in the EU and with the US 
The German legislature has pointed to the rules of France and the US in the context 
of the reasoning for the proposed extension of the share ownership reporting 
obligations to also cover the goals pursued with and the source of funds for the 
acquisition of significant shareholdings. There is an explicit reference to Section 
13(d) of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), and that US law 
requires disclosure of the goals pursued with and the source of funds for an 
investment triggered by the acquisition of a shareholding of 5% or more. There are, 
however, significant differences. 
 
Pursuant to Section 13 of the 1934 Act, as we have seen, fund managers generally 
report on Schedule 13G rather than Schedule 13D, and thus are not subject to the 
5% disclosure requirement noted above. More in detail, the US rules allow 
managers to “disaggregate” holdings for reporting purposes if different entities 
within their group exercise investment discretion to acquire or dispose of securities 
and proxy voting separately and independently.  This concept of “disaggregation” is 
also found in the reporting rules in the EU Transparency Directive and the French 
takeover rules. 
 
Under the US rules, in the case of a passive investment, a qualified fund manager 
will be eligible to file a short-form report on Schedule 13G and will, thus, not be 
required to make any disclosure regarding the source and amount of funds used for 
the acquisition of its shareholding and the purposes of the acquisition, regardless of 
the size of its shareholding.  Under the proposed new German rules on extended 
share ownership disclosure, the acquisition of a significant shareholding will trigger 
an obligation to disclose the source of funds used for the acquisition and the 
purposes pursued with the acquisition.  The proposal does not provide for a general 
exemption from the extended share ownership disclosure obligations for qualified 
investors making a passive investment. 
 
The wording of the proposed new German acting in concert rules seems broader 
and less specific than the US rules on groups in the sense that under the new 
German acting in concert rules, the relevant coordination of conduct is not limited 
to the “acquisition, holding, voting and disposal” of securities, and can be in 
reference to an event or specific proposal in relation to a company. Also, it may be 
easier to infer a common objective from parallel conduct under the proposed new 
German rules. The consequences of “acting in concert” under the German draft law 
are significantly more far reaching than those of forming a “group” under the US 
law by virtue of the German mandatory offer rules. As for the UK legal system, there 
are legal barriers to joint actions, and in many regards they are similar to those in 
                                                 
119 Black (1990, p. 556). 
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the US, but they are fewer in number, and those which are the most inhibiting do 
not exist. Regarding the draft German law which requires a coalition which exceeds 
5% to state its shareholding, its identity and, above all, its intentions in relation to 
the company, this is only valid given a formal agreement, and an informal 
agreement is not sufficient as in the United States. This, therefore, seems to be a 
particularly restrictive provision. 
 
A 1989 amendment to the UK Companies Act lowered the threshold for disclosure 
of major shareholdings to 3% from 5%. However, the requirement for 
documentation in Britain is much more limited than that required under rule 13 (d) 
of the United States’ Exchange Act according to the interpretation which the SEC 
has provided of it. Only a formal agreement triggers the requirement to present 
documents to the local authority and, more importantly, there is no requirement to 
state intentions in relation to the company, so the risk of legal action for incomplete 
disclosure is very remote. In the UK, like in the US, fear of insider trading liability, 
or of losing liquidity because of possessing inside information, is a significant 
obstacle to close communication between managers and their major shareholders. 
 
6.2.7 Conclusion on the present section  
The way in which acting in concert is regulated in Europe and in the US might 
affect in different ways the possibility for institutional investors to have an active 
role in the governance of a company. As we have seen, the current definition of 
acting in concert provided by the Takeover Directive gives wide discretion to 
Member States as of the meaning of control, to such an extent that it does not 
preclude it to be applied to discourage shareholder activism. In turn, the European 
national regulators have customized the European rules on acting in concert with 
rather different results. On the one hand, some legal systems (Germany and Italy) 
have introduced ambiguous provisions (see Table 6). The difficulty in interpreting 
such rules may lead to a certain degree of uncertainty, both for investors – for 
whom it might be difficult to predict whether their conduct might be considered as 
acting in concert – and public authorities, who are confronted with the task of 
applying the existing provisions when detecting the actual existence of acting in 
concert. On the other hand, some legislators have introduced far-reaching rules. 
This is the case of the French and the German provisions on acting in concert 
which could discourage investors' activism. However, the UK's City Code and 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules contain detailed and unambiguous provisions 
for the interpretation of acting in concert which do not prevent shareholder activism. 
 
VII.   SECURITIES LENDING120  
 
Securities lending normally consists in the outright transfer of securities by the 
lender to the borrower who undertakes to transfer equivalent securities back to the 
lender at a later point in time. Voting rights pass with the transfer of the 
securities.121 
Securities lending provides liquidity to capital markets (equity, bond and money 
markets), with an estimated 3 trillion US dollar of securities on loan at any given 
time. On the lending side, securities lending forms a growing part of the revenue, 
                                                 
120  Unless otherwise specified this section is based on the public consultation organised by the European 
Commission during the summer 2007. The text of the consultation and the comments of respondents are 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexa_en.htm  
121 As observed by Spitalfields (2005), p. 5, the word "lending" is to a certain extent misleading, being an 
absolute transfer of title against an undertaking to return equivalent securities. 
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among others, of institutional investors.122 On the borrowing side, securities lending 
plays an important role in ensuring market liquidity by making settlement123 more 
flexible, taking into account that settlement, in today's markets, often takes several 
days. Securities lending also allows for arbitrage and can offer advantages where 
tax laws provide for privileges for the payment of dividends. The benefits that stock 
lending provides to the market were recognised almost unanimously by the 
respondents to the consultation held by European Commission (2007). 
Although the practical relevance of securities lending has diminished in the last few 
years due to tighter tax regulation, in a number of Member States there are still 
some systems where securities lending can be advantageous for the parties involved. 
Securities lending around dividend record dates also takes place where companies 
offer their shareholders the choice to receive the dividend either in stock or in 
cash.124  
7.1. Investor activism and securities lending  
While OECD (2007d, p. 5) observes that in principle there is nothing problematic 
about share lending, according to SLRC (2004) securities lenders should also 
consider their corporate governance responsibilities before lending stock over a 
period in which an annual general shareholder meeting or an extraordinary general 
shareholder meeting is expected to be held. The OECD Prinicples of Corporate 
Governance (II.F.1)125 recommend that "Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary 
capacity should disclose their overall corporate governance and voting policies with 
respect to their investments, including the procedures that they have in place for 
deciding on the use of their voting rights." 
Under the commonly used Master agreements, as for example the Global Master 
Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA) issued by the International Stock Lending 
Association (ISLA),126 there is no obligation incumbent on the borrower to exercise 
the voting right in line with instructions issued by the lender if there is not an 
explicit agreement to the contrary. 127  There are no provisions contained in it 
stressing the influence of the stock lending agreement on the voting right. The 
"Securities Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance" set up by the by the 
Securities Lending and Repo Committee (chaired and administered by the Bank of 
England), that however is only applicable in the UK, states that provision should be 
made between the parties of a stock lending agreement concerning the exercise of 
the votes. It furthermore encourages lenders to consider their corporate governance 
responsibilities before lending stock over a period for which an annual general 
meeting or an extraordinary general meeting can be expected.128 However, even in 
                                                 
122 Spitalfields (2005) and EFAMA (2006). According to Hu and Black (2006), CalPERS, the large Californian 
public-sector pension fund, earned $103 million from securities lending for its fiscal year 2004. According to 
Kahan and Rock (2007a), p. 10, beneficial owners in the US earn about 5 USD billion a year in fees from 
securities lending. 
123 According to Giovannini Group (2001), "The clearing and settlement process is an essential feature of a 
smoothly functioning securities market, providing for the efficient and safe transfer of ownership from the seller 
to the buyer. The process involves four main steps, which are confirmation of the terms of the securities trade, 
clearance of the trade by which the respective obligations of the buyer and seller are established, delivery of the 
securities from the seller to the buyer and the reciprocal payment of funds. When both delivery and payment are 
finalised, settlement of the securities transaction has been achieved." 
124 See the example in Spitalfields (2005). 
125 OECD (2004). 
126 Available at: http://www.isla.co.uk/industry_documentation.asp  
127 Point 6.3 of the GMSLA 
128 Point C.7.4 of the Code of Guidance. 
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that code, there is no recommendation with a view to ensuring that voting rights are 
exercised in an appropriate way during the duration of the loan (or that the loan is 
returned in time to allow for the lender to exercise the voting right himself).129  
According to EFAMA (2006) what happens in practice is that standard stock lending 
agreements provide for the recall of shares lent, usually within two working days. 
The consequence is that the practice of stock lending does not prevent in principle 
shareholders to vote. 130  However, it is essential that the record date for the 
shareholder meeting is convened sufficiently in advance so as to allow fund 
managers to recall the shares on loan and that the notice convening a shareholder 
meeting be issued well in advance to the record date, at least ten days according to 
EFAMA. This problem has already been addressed in the Shareholder Rights 
Directive (art. 7.3) which provides for a minimum period of 8 calendar days to be 
respected between the convocation of the meeting and the record date. The 
minimum requirements set by the Shareholder Rights Directive are deemed by 
EFAMA to be barely sufficient.  
According to HFWG (2008), there is a concern that some market participants could 
borrow stock in order to vote at shareholder meetings, while not being economically 
exposed. As a result, the voting rights attaching to the holding would not 
necessarily be exercised in the best interest of the lender who has the economic 
exposure. The HFWG is concerned that this use of borrowed stock undermines 
investor confidence in the results of shareholder votes. Since this issue is not 
specific to hedge funds but is of wider application, the HFWG would welcome wider 
consultation with regulators and market participants to develop a regime that is 
applicable to all parties and ties votes to underlying economic exposure. Moreover, 
there might be specific situations where it should be acceptable to vote on borrowed 
stock, e.g. when a fund is invested in shares (and the trade has settled), but the 
shares have not transferred into their name. 
For the moment, the "more commonplace" position seems to be that securities are 
recalled only in such special circumstances as when a takeovers is being considered, 
while there are still organisations that choose not to vote in any circumstances due 
to the transaction costs involved in vote recalling and to lack of interest in voting.131 
                                                 
129  See points C.2.2., C.2.5 and C.7.3 of the Code of Guidance, available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/gilts/slrc.htm  
130 According to Spitalfields (2005), "Recalls are part and parcel of the securities lending business. However, 
borrowers seek to avoid recalls wherever possible and frequent recalls may discourage borrowers from accessing 
portfolios. In practice the lenders, or their agents, communicate the lender's position with regards to voting to the 
borrowers so as to avoid any surprises." From the answers to the consultation held by  European Commission 
(2005) and (2007) it emerges that there are three securities lending models typically used by an investor: (1) 
Lending by the investor himself as a direct lender, who would manage his own securities lending trading 
activities; (2) Lending by a third party lender, whereby the investor would outsource the lending to a third party 
agent to negotiate the loans; (3) Lending by a custody lending agent, whereby the investor would outsource the 
lending to his custodian, who would act as lending agent. In all cases, the securities will normally be held with a 
custodian who will arrange delivery of the loans and might also monitor the collateral receipts. The first two cases 
should not create problems in terms of transparency as here the investor should be informed of the lending 
transaction at least by the end of the business day. In the third case, where a custody lending agent manages 
the lending, the investor has to await activity reports from the custodian. Where no activity report has been 
established or reached the investor or where an investor wants to vote his shares between two activity reports he 
might discover at that moment that his shares are lent and that he therefore is prevented from doing so. An 
additional problem arises where the investor has outsourced also the voting process: here the voting agency may 
not even be informed about the stock lending where the information does indeed reach the investor. 
131 Spitalfields (2005) and Hu and Black (2006). 
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ESME, the group of European Security Markets Experts established by the 
Commission, points out in its first report on the Transparency Directive132 that a 
systematic recall is not even desirable as it would lead to reducing the liquidity of 
the market.  
Myners (2007) also recommends, among other things, that in case of contentious 
votes stock should not be lent, while ICGN (2005) recommends that stock should be 
lent according to consistent and clear policies.  
 
As for trends in securities lending, there seems to be a raising awareness on the 
part of fund managers to monitor the usage of lent securities. According to 
RiskMetrics (2007) fund managers have recently shifted from focusing exclusively 
on making sure that securities lending was profitable for funds to seeking also to 
ensure that the borrower is acting responsibly with the lent securities. Allaire and 
Firsirotu (2007) observe that some institutional investors (including some of 
Europe’s biggest pension funds) have stopped their share lending activities 
altogether. Finally, more than a half of the funds surveyed by NAPF (2007), 23 
funds, lend stock. Most of these (14) said they recall stock for contentious votes. In 
total, more than 70% of funds surveyed either do not lend stock or recall it in order 
to vote on contentious resolutions. 
 
7.2. Investor activism and securities borrowing  
According to Myners (2007), "borrowing shares for the purpose of acquiring the vote 
is inappropriate, as it gives a proportion of the vote to the borrower which has no 
relation to their economic stake in the company." The author goes on to quote SLRC 
(2004): "there is consensus in the market that securities should not be borrowed 
solely for the purposes of exercising the voting rights…" Micossi (2008) observes 
that "investors can temporarily increase their votes through derivative operations133 
or share lending. This may lead to alter outcomes of proxy fights or general 
meetings, not necessarily to the benefit of shareholders."  
But how many securities are borrowed for voting purposes? According to 
Spitalfields (2005), in the UK normal levels of borrowing seem to be around 3% of 
market capitalisation, with increases to around 6% coinciding with dividend dates. 
However, since for historical reasons the entitlement to the dividend in many EU 
countries is often linked to the date of the general meeting, it is not entirely clear 
whether this period increase in stock lending is exclusively linked to the purpose of 
receiving the dividend, at least with a view to countries that still maintain a tax 
privilege in this respect and in cases where the dividend is offered in stock. Even if 
the dividend record date does not normally correspond with the voting record date, 
it often lies too close to it to make sure that shares on the voting record date are 
with the lender (in order to allow her to vote them) and on the dividend record date 
with the borrower (in order to allow her to cash in the dividend). As for the US, 
Kahan and Rock (2007a)134 observe that with the increasing number of shareholder 
votes decided with close majorities, borrowed shares may sometimes have a decisive 
influence on the voting outcome. 
                                                 
132 ESME (2007), page 7. 
133 According to the author "it is possible for a hedge fund to purchase shares in two companies, one bidding to 
acquire the other, and then to hedge away the risk of shares in the acquiring company, and to vote in favour of 
the proposed acquisition at an abnormally high price in the general meeting of the target company. In this 
example, the investor's behaviour may damage the shareholders of the acquiring company." 
134 P. 2-3. 
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7.3 Separation of economic risk and voting rights and shareholder activism 
As observed by Hu and Black (2006, p. 1), equity derivatives and other capital 
market developments now allow shareholders to separate voting rights from 
economic ownership of shares (decoupling). It is a subject of current debate whether 
and to what extent shareholder activism conducted by having recourse to such 
means (empty voting)135 goes against the interest of other shareholders. The authors 
quote a number of cases where stock borrowing seems to have taken place in order 
to influence the outcome of votes in the general meeting. They draw the attention to 
the fact that in extreme cases empty voting can not only mean voting by investors 
who have no equivalent economic interest but even voting by investors who have a 
negative economic interest in the outcome of the vote, i.e. an interest to make the 
company enter into a transaction that, from its point of view, is economically 
disadvantageous. This can happen where the stock borrower is standing on the 
other side of that transaction (e.g. in a merger) and is able to draw benefits from the 
company's decision. Anabtawi and Stout (2008) 136  observe that minority 
shareholders in public companies push for corporate actions that serve their 
personal economic interests which are not necessarily aligned to the interest of the 
firm and its other shareholders. According to the authors, activist minority 
investors in public companies have the possibility to push through interested 
transactions, for instance making recourse to derivatives to hedge away their 
financial interest in the company. According to Hu and Black (2008) there is now 
substantial evidence that decoupling is important and common, and that it can 
materially affect the control of major corporations throughout the world.137 observe 
that empty voting might become more relevant in the US as long as voting outcomes 
in shareholder meetings are getting closer. From a contrary point of view, Kahan 
Rock (2007b, p. 42) observe that, in the absence of quantitative evidence, it is not 
clear to what extent empty voting is a significant problem.  
 
Even if there is not sufficient evidence at present that empty voting by way of stock 
lending is a relevant phenomenon, stock lending creates a problem for shareholder 
voting in another sense. As it emerges from European Commission (2007), many 
investors borrow stock for reasons other than for voting and do not make the effort 
of exercising the voting rights where a general meeting occurs during the period of 
lending. Also the lenders do not always insist that the shares be voted on the basis 
of their instructions. Furthermore, in the context of the lending agreement the 
lender receives collateral for the loan. This collateral may consist in cash but also in 
stock or other securities. Where stock is given as collateral, the same problem with 
a view to the voting rights attached can arise as for the lent stock.  
As observed by Hu and Black (2006, p. 1), decoupling is not exclusive to minority 
shareholders, but it might also be used by management and controlling 
shareholders to facilitate entrenchment and maintain control. According to the 
authors empty voting is just one of the techniques used to differentiate economic 
interest in a company from voting rights and perhaps not even the most widespread. 
From ISS et al. (2007) we observe for instance that companies listed in the EU make 
very frequent recourse to decoupling techniques. As observed by OECd (2007e, p. 
29), most forms of CEMs are permitted in most European countries and in the US. 
A notable exception is that in the US pyramids are discouraged by taxation. As for 
                                                 
135  Hu and Black (2008) define empty voting as voting while holding greater voting power than economic 
ownership.  
136 P. 7 and 34-47. 
137 The authors collect a list of 80 cases of decoupling around the world. 
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legal limitations to other forms of decoupling, while some EU Member States and 
the US prevent making recourse to some forms of decoupling such as multiple-
voting shares (ISS et al. 2007), the European Commission recently deemed not 
necessary to introduce limitations at EU level (European Commission 2007c). The 
Commission motivated such decision on the absence of available evidence on the 
link between decoupling and shareholder expropriation.  
 
In the absence of more coercitive regulatory interventions, decoupling seems to be 
discouraged by investors themselves. As we have seen above self-regulatory bodies 
explicitly discourage the recourse to empty voting, while other forms of decoupling 
are opposed by shareholders in the US, where most public companies employ a one 
share-one vote structure, which links economic interest to voting rights (Hu and 
Black 2006, p. 1). As for the EU, from ISS et al. (2007) it emerges that decoupling is 
quite widespread among the European Blue Chips, something which is perhaps 
linked with the lower weight and influence of institutional investors.   
 
The conclusion seems to be that the case against empty voting, if any, falls within 
the one share-one vote debate and should not be treated in isolation. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), 
and Faccio and Lang (2002) show that in many cases European companies are 
characterised by individual or a family control over the majority of the votes via 
pyramids and other such instruments as multiple voting shares, cross-holdings, 
shareholder agreements and so on. As observed by Mork et al (2005), entrusting the 
governance of huge slices of a country's corporate sector to a tiny elite can bias 
capital allocation, retard capital market development, obstruct entry by outsider 
entrepreneurs, and retard growth.  
 
Although no systematic data are available on the degree of separation of ownership 
from control across the entire EU, there are signs that such a phenomenon can 
reach rather impressive extremes. As shown by Enriques and Volpin (2007),138 
thanks to company pyramids separation of ownership from control can go as far as 
giving the controlling shareholder of the French Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy 
(LVMH) 47 percent of the voting rights in LVMH with a direct and indirect 
ownership of 34 percent of the cash flow rights (Figure 1). The separation of 
ownership from control is more dramatic in Telecom Italia, one of the world’s largest 
telecom companies with a market capitalization of about $40 billion. The pyramidal 
group includes three listed companies and two nonlisted companies, shown in 
Figure 2. Marco Tronchetti Provera controls 18 percent of the votes in Telecom Italia 
(and is by far its largest shareholder), although he holds only 0.7 percent of the 
cash flow rights. Because of the combined effect of the dual classes of shares and 
the pyramidal structure, the Porsche family controls 25.1 percent of the votes in 
Volkswagen AG but owns only 9.44 percent of its cash flow rights. 
 
Family control can even go beyond a specific listed companies to reach systemic 
dimensions: for instance Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt and Svancar (2001) show that 
in Sweden a single family shareholder controls about 50% of the Stockholm stock 
exchange mainly through recourse to company pyramids and multiple-voting rights. 
According to Faccio and Lang (2002) a single Italian family controls about 10% of 
the Borsa Italiana total market capitalization. More in general, according to the 
findings reviewed in Morck et al. (2005), the large corporate sectors, excluding 
state-owned enterprises, of several EU countries are predominantly controlled by a 
                                                 
138 P. ** 
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small number of very wealthy families through pyramids and such other means as 
dual-class shares, cross shareholdings and differential voting shares.    
 
More in general, systematic measurements of the separation of ownership from 
control are available only for Italy. Bianchi et al. (2005) show that the Italian listed 
companies are characterised by a high incidence of pyramidal structures, 
shareholder agreements, and shareholder coalitions.  
 
On the other hand, the study conducted by ISS et al. (2007) quantifies the recourse 
to the various instruments that allow to obtain separation of ownership from 
control, the so called control-enhancing mechanisms, or CEMs. The study shows 
that corporate CEMs are rather common across the EU. Of all the 464 European 
companies considered, 44% have one or more corporate CEMs (or other alternative 
mechanism). The countries with the highest proportion of companies featuring at 
least one these mechanisms are, in decreasing order, France, Sweden, Spain, 
Hungary and Belgium, which all have a majority of companies with corporate CEMs 
or alternative mechanisms. The occurrence of those mechanisms varies from one 
country to another, but varies also between large companies and recently listed 
companies. A majority of large caps (52% of the companies analysed) have corporate 
CEMs or alternative mechanisms while one quarter of recently listed companies 
(26% of the companies analysed) have corporate CEMs or alternative mechanisms. 
Overall, the more used mechanisms are pyramid structures, multiple voting rights 
shares, and shareholders agreements. It is also interesting to notice that recently 
listed companies in Europe which were included in the ISS sample feature a smaller 
number and a smaller variety of those mechanisms than large companies. As in 
large companies, pyramid structures, shareholders agreements and multiple voting 
rights shares are the most common mechanisms in recently listed companies. 
Finally, some of these companies combine different mechanisms thereby enhancing 
their impact. 
 
From European Commission (200*) institutional investors seem to deem deviations 
from proportionality between capital and control an obstacle to shareholder 
activism. OECD (2007e, p. 23-7) quotes several corporate governance codes issued 
by investor groups and individual institutional investors that support, although to a 
different extent, one-share-one-vote principles: from ICGN’s recommendation that 
ordinary shares should feature one vote for one share, to Euroshareholders’ 
Corporate Governance Guidelines and Hermes that directly endorse proportionality 
between ownership and voting rights.  
 
Manifest (2007) stresses the role of the 'one share one vote' issue as fundamental to 
shareholder democracy and the protection of shareholders' rights. In particular, 
voting restrictions and unequal voting rights may present a significant disincentive 
for investors to participate in company meetings, may add confusion to the voting 
process and may lead to errors in the determination of voting rights.  
 
ISS et al (2007) also conducted a survey addressing institutional investors. The 
purpose of the survey was to determine whether and to what extent investment 
decisions are influenced by the ways companies do or do not follow the 
proportionality between capital and control. The survey was distributed to 7,792 
investors, corresponding to all the institutional investors identified worldwide. In 
total, 445 institutional investors worldwide replied to the questionnaire. They 
represent collectively more than 13% of assets under management in Europe, that 
is more than 4.9 trillion euros. Such figures are underestimated as 59 respondents 
(13% of the total) chose not to disclose their assets under management. Most of the 
 41
respondents to the survey, by number, have an asset manager profile (60%). The 
second largest group of respondents has a hedge fund profile (11%), closely followed 
by pension funds (10%). A majority of the investors surveyed by ISS et al. (2007) 
perceive all CEMs negatively. However, some CEMs are perceived as more negative 
than others. CEMs that investors perceive most negatively are priority shares, 
golden shares, voting right ceilings, pyramid structures, multiple voting rights 
shares, ownership ceilings, non-voting shares and to a lesser extent cross-
shareholdings and depositary certificates.  
 
Depending on the type of CEM, between 58% and 92% of investors say they take 
the presence of CEMs into account in their investment decisions. Multiple voting 
right shares impact investors’decisions most. In addition, 80% of investors would 
expect a discount on the shares price of companies with CEMs. This discount 
ranges from 10% to 30% of the share price for the majority of investors who 
attempted to quantify it. This discount is seen in the first place as compensation for 
the absence of a bid premium. It is also seen as the price of a vote, as a 
compensation for a lower valuation, and as the remuneration of the extra risk taken 
by minority shareholders in a company that may not defend their interests. 
 
The conclusion of this section is that separating risk from voting rights has 
ambiguous effects on shareholder activism. With regard to stock lending it is not 
clear whether it has a zero effect on investor activism, that is whether the lenders 
are not interested in voting and the borrowers make use of the voting rights 
attached to the borrowed shares. On the other hand, empty voting seems to be a 
boost of minority shareholders’ activism while separation of risk from voting rights 
put in place by managers and controlling shareholders limits investors’ activism. 
From the relevant literature quoted above it seems that the recourse to decoupling 
by controlling shareholders might be more important than the recourse to stock 
lending and empty voting by institutional investors in continental Europe.  
 
VIII. NEW DATA ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS VOTING RECORD IN THE US 
AND THE EU 
As we have seen above (ch. 3), since 2003 in the US institutional investors must 
disclose their voting policy and their voting record. Rothberg and Lilien (2006) 
examine the voting record for the twelve months up to August 2004 for ten mutual 
fund families which accounted in 2004 for about two-thirds of the industry total 
assets under management. They find that the five large mutual funds sampled 
voted against management an average of 17% of the time, with percentages of votes 
against management higher than average on antitakeover issues (in the first place 
dual-class shares) and executive compensation. Votes against management 
regarding the election of directors were on average 14%, the main reason being 
boards lacking a majority of independent directors. The sampled leading mutual 
funds also showed little support for a social or political activist agenda. In the 
absence of such a requirement in the EU, a best practice seems to be emerging, at 
the initiative primarily of global investors who have to comply with the US 
transparency requirements but also of investors that are aware of the importance of 
giving full accountability to their clients. One third of the UK funds surveyed by 
NAPF (2007) disclose details of how specific votes have been cast at company 
meetings.  
 
As we have also observed above (par. 1.3), voting is just one of the possible forms of 
institutional investor activism. However, we observe that institutional investors that 
disclose their voting record in the US and in the EU tend to have as a policy to vote 
 42
the great majority of shares they own: the mutual funds examined by Rothberg and 
Lilien (2006) voted in 2003-2004 for almost 98% of their shares. The examination of 
their voting record can then be considered as a proxy of their entire range of activist 
measures.   
 
In this chapter we illustrate the voting record in the US and in the EU of two sets of 
institutional investors. The first one is made of 76 institutional investors…The 
second one…Of all the investors considered, Hermes is the only one for which we 
have a voting record for the US and the EU at the same time. 
 
8.1 Voting record in the US 
 
Voting record in the US of 75 mutual funds139 
Table 12 illustrates the percentages of votes cast by the 75 funds considered (detail 
in table 13) in favour and against proposals, as well as the percentage of abstain 
votes cast. The table also differentiates between management proposals and 
shareholder proposals (the detail is listed in table 14). The percentage of votes in 
favour of management proposals admitted to shareholder vote is 88%, against 1% of 
abstain votes and 11% of votes cast by the 75 shareholders considered against 
shareholder resolutions. As for shareholder proposals, on the whole they do not 
total the majority of the votes cast (36%), while the abstain votes are equal to 8% 
and the votes against such proposals are equal to 56%. Of course it is important to 
investigate on the types of proposals and, in the case of shareholder proposals, from 
which shareholder such proposals are formulated.  
 
Preliminarily, table 15 illustrates the incidence of the various categories of 
proposals on total votes cast. Director election is by far the most important item 
voted at US shareholder meetings (almost 68% of the total votes cast). This 
corresponds to the literature examined above according to which the main issues in 
US company life turn around the election of the slate of directors proposed by the 
management. Interestingly, there is no correspondent category of shareholder 
proposal concerning director election, proof that alternative slates of directors are 
very difficult for shareholders to present to voting at the general meetings. The next 
most important category of proposal is auditor ratification (9%), followed by other 
management proposals (7%), and executive compensation (6%). As it can be seen 
from table 14, all such proposals are management proposals. The total incidence of 
shareholder proposals on total votes cast adds up to less than 4% of total votes cast, 
with the most recurring item (executive compensation proposed by shareholders) 
adding up to 1% of total votes cast. Such results correspond to previous findings in 
the literature. Table 21 provides a ranking of corporate governance proposals based 
on Gillian and Starks (2007) which shows executive compensation as the type of 
shareholder proposal most frequently submitted.   
 
We now move on to examine (table 16) the percentage of votes cast by shareholders 
according to each specific resolution. Beginning with the management resolutions, 
we observe that the 75 funds considered voted globally in favour of all the 
                                                 
139 The database was provided by Andy Eggers of www.proxidemocracy.org. The goal in data collection for this 
preliminary database was to get votes from: the largest 3-4 retail large-cap funds from the largest fund families; 
the leading socially responsible funds; two other leaders in vote transparency, CBIS and CalPERS. There are 
omissions due to the data being difficult to access or parse, including American Funds (the 2nd US largest fund 
family) and PIMCO. The assumption is that each fund’s voting record is representative of the entire family of 
funds to which it belongs. Such an assumption is based on the finding by Rothberg and Lilien (2006, p. 162) that 
fund families tend to make proxy decision at an aggregate level. 
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categories of management resolutions, with percentages varying from 76% to 94%. 
In particular, the management resolutions that gathered more consensus were 
those concerning auditor ratification, mergers and acquisitions and corporate 
governance (94%), director election (88%), and executive compensation (81%), the 
latter item confirming the particular antagonist attitude of the shareholders 
considered vis-à-vis director remuneration. Among those proposals that gathered 
less consensus we signal issuance of stock (79%), perhaps attributable to a concern 
for possible dilution of the dividend rights for the existing shares. As for 
shareholder resolutions, we notice in the first place that just one of the shareholder 
resolutions gathers a majority consensus, and that consensus varies according to 
the type of shareholder proposal. The higher rate of support is gathered by those 
shareholder resolutions that sustain corporate governance issues: in the first place 
“takeover defense” (80%), perhaps attributable to shareholders’ sensitivity to 
staggered boards, poison pills and other anti-takeover tactics; “voting rules” is the 
first category of shareholder resolutions to gather majority approval (59%, 
something which fits with the literature quoted above which refers to shareholders’ 
sensitivity to cumulative voting), followed by executive compensation (37%) and 
board independence (30%).   
 
A lower degree of consensus is gathered by those shareholder resolutions that 
promote social issues, such as proposals on environmental and social issues (11%), 
political influence and charitable contributions (14%), employment and working 
conditions (20%). 
 
Since five out of the 75 funds considered here are socially-responsive investors, it is 
interesting to observe the degree of support from such investors for the latter 
category of shareholder resolutions (table 17). As expected, such funds express 
much stronger support for all the socially-oriented shareholder resolutions. 
However, such funds also voet strongly in favour of corporate-governance 
shareholder resolutions such as on executive compensation and board 
independence and performance. Finally, socially-engaged funds tend also to vote 
less in favour of the management on such key management resolutions as director 
election (56% against 88% of votes in favour cast by our total sample of 75 funds) 
and executive compensation (66% against 81%).    
 
Voting record in the US by T.RowePrice 
Table 24 reproduces the voting disclosure by T.RowePrice for the period July 2006-
June 2007 compared to the period July 2006-June 2005. In both periods the total 
voting was for more than 80% in favour of management, a figure which is in line 
with the voting expressed by the 75 funds as illustrated above (although not to the 
5 socially-engaged funds included in the sample of 75 funds). We find here a 
confirmation of the inflationary contribution of broker voting in favour of 
management, which here looks about half of the broker votes cast. The investor 
expressed its closest support for the management for such issues as those auditor 
related, director election, and mergers and acquisitions, something which confirms 
the voting record for the 75 funds examined in the previous paragraphs. A more 
adversarial stance was taken by T.RowePrice on subjects such as separation of 
Chairman and Ceo, cumulative voting, anti-takeover provisions, and especially in 
supporting majority voting for the election of directors, once again a confirmation of 
the previous voting record examined. The investor sided strongly with the 
management on socially-minded resolutions, with the exception of resolutions on 
political contributions, also confirming the previous voting record and the literature 
quoted above.  
 
 44
8.2 Voting record in the EU 
 
Hermes voting record  
We provide here an analysis of the Hermes voting record in the UK, the rest of 
Europe and in the US with reference to their share portfolio managed on behalf of 
the British Telecom pension fund. The data refer to the 3d and 4th quarters 2006 
and to the 1st-2nd 2007 and include more than 2000 voting decisions voted in 
Europe and in the US.140  
 
Table 10 and 11 represent Hermes' voting record at shareholder meetings in 
Europe and in the US. The first observation concerns the number of companies' 
meeting in which Hermes voted over the period considered, the first group being 
made of UK companies (998) followed by the US (663). Continental Europe follows 
with much less important numbers, roughly distributed according to the number of 
listed companies in each of the countries considered, with France, Germany, and 
Italy with respectively 83, 72, and 68 voted companies, followed by Spain, by the 
Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Austria.  
 
As for the voting record, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the 
UK are the countries with the highest percentage of votes expressed in favour of 
company management. In such countries Hermes voted all the items on the agenda 
in favour of management in more than 80% of meetings (Table 10, fifth column).  A 
second group of countries is made of those where Hermes voted between 60% and 
70% of meetings in favour of management all the items on the agenda: Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal. In this 
group also the US are included. In the last group are a few countries for which 
Hermes has a low and very low voting record in favour of the board: Belgium, 
France, Greece, Spain. The case of France is particularly interesting, since only in 
20% of meetings Hermes voted in favour of the board on all the items on the agenda. 
Such a datum translates (Table 10, fourth column) in an average number of votes 
against management of 3.8, by far the highest rate in the entire panel of countries 
(see also Table 11 on all such points).  
 
Fidelity voting record141  
The very low percentage of French shareholder meetings at which Hermes voted in 
favour of management raises the question whether this fact is investor specific. It 
also raises the question whether the “all for “ measurement might be impaired by 
other legal or structural factors. As for the first point, we observe (Table 26) that 
even in the case of Fidelity France shows a much lower percentage of “all for” votes 
than other European countries. As for the second point, from the voting record 
expressed by Fidelity it is also possible to calculate the average number of voting 
items per meeting, which shows that in France shareholders vote a much higher 
number of items per meeting than the UK, Germany, and Italy, but only slightly 
higher than Sweden. This could raise the objection that it is more difficult to have 
                                                 
140 The data are available at: http://www.hermes.co.uk/corporate_governance/voting_disclosure.htm  
141  http://www.fidelity.co.uk/direct/aboutus/corporategovernance/votingrecord.html and 
http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/?refhp=pr. Fidelity proxy voting guidelines focus on four 
types of proposals. Election of Directors: Fidelity will generally vote in favor of incumbent and nominee directors 
except where a director has failed to exercise reasonable judgment. Equity-Based Compensation: states to 
generally vote against equity award plans or amendments that are too dilutive to existing shareholders, may be 
materially altered without shareholder approval, permit options repricing, allow management discretion in 
granting certain awards, or are otherwise inconsistent with the interests of shareholders. Anti-Takeover Plans: 
Fidelity will generally vote against a proposal to adopt or approve the adoption of an anti-takeover plan unless 
the plan includes a number of provisions that are designed to protect shareholders. 
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an “all for” voting record the higher the number of items to be voted. Fidelity voting 
record also allows to calculate the percentage of votes in favour of management as a 
percentage of total votes cast by shareholders, which should allow to discount the 
differences in the number of items voted across countries. The result is that the 
distance between France and the other European countries is much less important. 
On the other hand, although Sweden has a comparable average number of items 
per meeting than France, it shows a much higher incidence of “for” votes (93% 
against 80%). No matter which voting variable used, France is still behind the UK, 
Germany, and Sweden. The much more adversarial character of the Fidelity vote in 
French companies is confirmed looking at the percentage of “against” votes on the 
total number of items voted (with France showing the highest percentage, 8%, 
compared to Germany, 4%, Sweden 2%, and the UK, 1%) and at the percentage of 
“abstain” votes (8% for France compared to less than 1% for the UK and Sweden 
and zero for Germany).  
 
A different case concerns Italy, which shows a low percentage of “all for” votes 
(higher only than France) and the lowest percentage of “for” votes. However, the 
main factor explaining this record seems to be not so much an adversariality vis-à-
vis Italian management (the percentage of “against” votes is very low, the same as 
the UK’s) as a very low participation of Fidelity to shareholder meetings in Italy: 
Table 26 shows that Fidelity voted only 71% of the items, against 97% for Sweden, 
98% for France, 99% for the UK, and 100% for Germany. This raises the question 
on the causes of such a low presence of Fidelity at the Italian shareholder meetings. 
One explanation could be in terms of costs of proxy voting, which might be 
particularly high in Italy (see above ch. *). Other possible explanations might be a 
favour for company management which, united with the high percentage of shares 
owned by the controlling shareholders, might discourage Fidelity from voting.  
 
More in general, the ranking of the consensus for companies’ management 
expressed by Herms is confirmed by Fidelity. Although the percentages vary 
(Fidelity in general seems to be more favourable to company boards than Hermes) 
the UK is still the country which collects the highest investor consensus in favour of 
the board, followed  
 
There is also a confirmation on the composition of the portfolio with respect to 
Hermes, which even in the case of Fidelity seems to follow the number of companies 
listed in the different countries.  
 
NBIM voting record  
Even in the case of NBIM (Table 23) France shows the highest level of investor 
adversariality, with 73% of votes cast in favour of management against 86% for 
Germany and 97% for the UK. This result is also confirmed by the percentage of 
votes against management, with France showing by far the highest percentage 
(26%) against Germany (14%) and the UK (2%). Italy is not included in the portfolio 
of countries voted by NBIM. 
 
The NBIM voting record replicates, although for a smaller number of countries, the 
ranking of the two other investors considered above, with the only exception of the 
high percentage of votes in favour of management in Spain. For the rest, Sweden 
and the UK confirm their position ahead of Germany and The Netherlands, with 
France in a much lower position.  
 
Morley voting record  
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The voting record disclosed by Morley shows, as in the previous cases examined, 
France at the lower end of the voting spectrum, with only 9% of the meeting voted 
“all for” (zero scored by Luxembourg is based on only one observation), and the UK 
and Scandinavian countries at the higher end. An outlier is Sweden, which here 
performs badly (only 10% of “all for”), differently from the two funds previously 
examined. In the middle of the distribution we Ireland and Italy, while Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain follow behind, ahead of France and Sweden.   
 
Standard Life Investments UK voting record  
Standard Life vote its clients' shares at the AGMs of all their UK shareholdings but 
historically have only voted at selected European AGMs. Standard Life is currently 
planning to vote more generally at European AGMs. For its UK voting, Standard Life 
has a policy of voting disclosure with regard to meetings at which it abstains or 
votes against any of the resolutions.142 Voting disclosure (Table 22) shows for the 
UK a 85% of votes in favour of all management resolutions (“all for”) presented at a 
specific meeting. However, it is not possible to evaluate such record with reference 
to other countries.  
 
Provident Voting record143 
The voting record disclosed by Provident confirms the voting ranking expressed by 
the previous investors, with the UK performing ahead of Germany and France 
following behind (Table 19).144 The table also confirms that Sweden collects a high 
level of votes in favour of management and that the Netherlands tend to follow 
Germany. The two outliers here are Spain (which performs very well here) and Italy, 
where Provident showed up to vote only in 10% of the cases, confirming the high 
ratio of absence from voting already observed above with the Fidelity voting record.  
 
8.3 Comparison of the voting records for the EU and the US 
To sum up the evidence collected in the present section for Europe, we observe (see 
also tables 27-30 for a comparison of the five main voting records examined) that 
the institutional investors considered have a much more adversarial voting vis-à-vis 
French (and Greek and Belgian) company boards than elsewhere in Europe. The 
evidence also shows that the UK tends to stay at the other end of the spectrum, 
with the highest percentages of votes in favour of management and the lowest 
percentages of abstention votes and votes against management. Third, the funds 
examined tend to vote very favourably also in Scandinavian countries, although two 
funds out of five tend to vote less favourably in the case of Swedish companies. 
Fourth, Germany tends to be ahead of France, Greece and Belgium, on the same 
level with the Scandinavian countries considered collectively (but ahead of Sweden) 
and behind the UK. The voting record in Dutch companies tends to be less 
favourable than in German companies but still well ahead of French, Greek and 
Belgian ones. Finally, Italy and Spain tend to have the highest level of variance in 
                                                 
142 Voting disclosure is at: 
http://uk.standardlifeinvestments.com/content/profile/shareholder/voting_disclosure/voting_disclosure_index.htm
l  
143 
http://www.friendsprovident.co.uk/common/layouts/subSectionLayout.jhtml?pageId=fpcouk%2FSitePageSimple
%3Avoting+record#  
144 Even in this case France shows the highest average number of voting items per meeting which seems to 
translate in a difference from the other countries in terms of “all for” higher than the distance expressed in terms 
of “for” votes. Using the UK as a benchmark, while Provident voted “all for” in France just 8/1000 times against 
7/100 times in the UK, it voted in favour of the board 80% of resolutions against 98% in the UK and against the 
board 17% of resolutions in France against 1% in the UK. 
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our investors’ voting record, which for Italy might be explained at least in part with 
the low percentage of meetings voted.  
 
The voting record seems to show a pattern correspondent to the literature on the 
European legal families referred to in Shleifer (2008). According to this literature 
legal rules protecting investors vary systematically among legal traditions or origins, 
with the laws of common law countries being more protective of outside investors 
than the laws of civil law countries. The European countries voted by the investors’ 
voting record available in our paper are attributed to this literature to the common 
law tradition (UK, US, Canada and Ireland), the German legal tradition (Germany, 
Austria), the French legal tradition (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
The Netherlands, Greece and Italy), and the Scandinavian legal tradition (Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, and Norway). Our findings show that the degree of support for 
board and management resolutions by the institutional investors considered in this 
paper goes according to legal traditions, with the highest degree of consensus fro 
the UK, followed by Scandinavian and German countries, and lastly by French civil 
law countries.  
 
Moving on to compare the voting record in the US with the UK (two countries which, 
as observed above, have a similar shareholder structure made of widely held 
companies), we observe from the Hermes voting record (table 10) a significantly 
higher voting record in favour of management in the UK where Hermes voted 89% of 
meetings all resolutions in favour of management against 67% of times in the US. 
Considering the votes in favour of management proposals (table 12) we observe for 
the US that the 75 institutional investors considered voted 88% in favour, and 
TRowePrice voted 87% of resolutions in favour of management in 2006-2007 and 
85% in 2005-2006 (table 24). The percentages of votes in favour of management are 
higher for the UK: 98% for Provident (table 19), 98% for NBIM (table 23), 98% for 
Fidelity (table 26). Such a difference is probably more important if we consider, as 
seen above, that broker voting makes an important part of total voting in the US (14 
percentage points according to PIRC 2007 out of a total voting attendance of 87% of 
total voting shares) and that brokers tend to vote in favour of management.  
 
Finally, comparing the voting record in the US with continental Europe (where 
admittedly, as seen above in chapter 3.1, companies have a much more 
concentrated shareholder structure than the US) we observe a higher percentage of 
votes in favour of management also in several continental European countries 
(Sweden, Germany, Spain). Again, the difference gets more important if we consider 
the broker voting component in the US voting record. 
 
8.4 Do national differences in shareholder rights explain different patterns in 
investor activism in the US and the EU? 
 
As we have seen above, in the US shareholders seem to have fewer voting rights 
than in the EU, particularly with reference to their more limited possibility to 
express their binding vote vis-à-vis the company management (table 25). The 
participants to the conference organised by ECGI (2007) formulated a thesis 
according to which shareholder rights could be a substitute for regulation. With 
reference to the different regulatory pattern in the US and in the UK, several 
participants to the conference observed a more interventionist stance for the US 
supervisory authorities vis-à-vis the UK ones. Our contribution to this debate is, in 
the light of the institutional investors' voting pattern examined in the previous 
paragraph, that institutional investors in the US seem to have a significantly more 
adversarial voting pattern vis-à-vis company managements than in the UK.  
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As for Europe, institutional investors' voting patterns seem to have a link with the 
incidence of separation of ownership from control. Institutional investors' voting 
pattern is by far more adversarial in France, the country for which ISS et al (2007) 
found the highest percentage of companies characterized by the presence of control-
enhancing mechanisms (see above chapter VI). From ISS et al (2007) it can also be 
observed that Belgium and Sweden have in common a high incidence of diversions 
from the one share one vote principle.  
 
Moreover, while there does not seem to be a link between investors’ voting patterns 
and other aspects considered in the present paper above such as the incidence of 
foreign investors on total share ownership (see above chapter III), voting patterns 
seem to be more adversarial in countries with higher obstacles to proxy voting 
(chapter IV and tables 3 and 4) and in countries with a higher ownership 
concentration (chapter III and tables 7 and 8).  
 
It is interesting to notice that investors’ dissatisfaction with the management of 
French companies takes place within a legal environment which provides 
guarantees for minority shareholders against expropriation by the management and 
controlling shareholders. As observed by Hertig and McCahery (2006), in France (as 
well as in the UK) minority shareholders have to approve transactions in conflict of 
interest. Institutional investors seem to attribute more importance to the presence 
of CEMs than to the guarantees that should compensate for their negative effects. 
On the other hand, institutional investors in Sweden seem to coexist more happily 
with the level of separation of ownership and control given by a significant presence 
of CEMs. For Sweden but not for France shareholders seem satisfied that “when 
functionally good law constrains the level of private benefits of control, minority 
shareholders benefit from a controlling shareholder’s more focused monitoring, 
leading to better performance.”145 It might be that beyond a critical level of CEMs 
legal safeguards against shareholder expropriation are not considered credible by 
institutional investors.  
 
The conclusion for Europe is that institutional investors seem to be very dissatisfied 
with French listed companies' governance, and to a lesser extent, Greece, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. However, they choose to express their dissatisfaction 
through an adversarial voting stance rather than by selling the shares. Perhaps 
surprisingly, institutional investors seem to be much less adversarial in such a 
country as Germany which has frequently been denounced for its recourse to cross-
shareholdings and for the presence of employees’ representatives on the supervisory 
boards. Italy and Spain are the surprise is even more important if we consider that 
it has been considered as one of the worst cases in the world for expropriation of 
minority shareholders.146  
 
8.5 Voting patterns in the US and the EU: a trend towards uniformity? 
The voting record examined shows uniformity in the case of the US funds, while in 
the case of the EU funds such uniformity is much less evident. The main two 
explanations for uniformity in the US seem to be in the first place (see chapter ** 
above) that in the US the legislative framework gives more space to institutional 
investor to coordinate their voting policies and practices than in at least some EU 
Member States. The second possible explanation is related to the much wider 
recourse to voting advisors by US funds than in the EU. As observed by Gordon 
                                                 
145 Gilson (2006).  
146 See Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Nenova (2003). 
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(2008),147 the importance of shareholder proposals in US corporate life is such as to 
have elicited the development of a new market for governance service 
intermediaries. 14 of the funds surveyed by NAPF (2007) subscribe to voting 
reference agencies. The agencies most often subscribed to were RREV/ISS, which 
uses the NAPF's corporate governance policy (nine funds) and PIRC (five funds). 
Other reference agencies were Manifest and Glass Lewis. Of the 14 funds which 
subscribe to voting reference agencies, eight had at some stage chosen not to follow 
the agency's recommendation. Rothberg and Lilien (2006, p. 163) find that in the 
majority of the voting record by institutional investors they examine vote followed 
the advice received from voting advisors, in the first place ISS (now Proxinvest). This 
raises the question whether and to what extent the voting activism of the mutual 
fund industry (and possibly of other institutional investors) is influenced by a small 
group of voting advisors. In this respect, concern has been expressed recently by 
the influence of such intermediaries on inevstors’ voting policies and on the 
possible existence of conflicts of interest. In the US Proxy Voting Group (2006) 
raised attention to the multiple roles of such groups in advising both companies 
and investors, as well as exercising votes on shareholders’ behalf.  
 
Examining the methodology disclosed by some of the main voting advisors, 
RiskMetrics (formerly ISS)148 offers analysis and voting recommendations based on 
its benchmark policies and best practices in corporate governance. RiskMetrics 
requests periodical feedback from its clients on the benchmark policies and best 
practices to be considered. for a supplementary fee, RiskMetrics also provides 
client-specific custom analyses and recommendations based on policy guidelines 
provided or developed in collaboration with individual clients. The voting advice 
provided by Glass, Lewis & Co.149 to its clients focuses, among others, on such 
governance issues as mergers and acquisitions, equity-based compensation, the 
composition of the board of directors, director remuneration, and auditor issues. 
Manifest150offers three levels of service, from a best-practice governance and voting 
policy to a personalized voting advisory service based on particular concerns funds 
may have and to a comparison with other funds’ voting policies. Proxinvest151 
performs an analysis of the company and the resolutions submitted to a vote of the 
shareholders through an analytical grid in which more than 150 legal and financial 
criteria can be combined and applied to each proposed resolution. At the request of 
certain investors, Proxinvest also supplies raw data or assigned ratings in the 
corporate governance area for listed European companies. Egan Jones152 provides 
its clients with voting recommendations based on two sets of voting guidelines so 
clients can choose whether shares should be voted with respect to Taft-Hartley 
concerns or whether overall shareholder value considerations should take 
precedence. Clients are also given the opportunity to review and override specific 
                                                 
147 P. 6. 
148 ISS merged in 2001 with its competitor Proxy Monitor. It has also acquired the research group IRRC and, 
outside the US, it took over Proxy Australia and, in Europe, the corporate governance division of Deminor (in 
2005). In the United Kingdom ISS has joined the forces with the Napf  (National Association of Pension Funds) in 
2003. Also as a result of this extensive acquisition campaign, ISS has become the dominant operator in its field.  
In 2007 ISS was acquired by the RiskMetrics Group: http://www.riskmetrics.com/issgovernance.html For more 
information See also Verdam (2006).  
149  http://www.glasslewis.com/downloads/overviews/proxypaper.pdf Glass Lewis' clients include money 
managers, mutual funds, hedge funds, public pension funds, labor union funds, SRI managers and religious 
pension funds.  
150 http://www.manifest.co.uk/services/governance_watch.htm  
151 http://www.proxinvest.com/index.php/fr/page/index.html  
152 http://www.ejproxy.com/services.aspx 
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proxy vote recommendations. PROXY Governance 153  takes into account several 
factors, such as an individual company’s financial performance relative to its 
industry, its business environment, the strength of its management and corporate 
strategy, and the quality of its corporate governance. Proxy Governance also allows 
its clients to have proxies voted based on their own policies, through an automated 
voting platform. 
 
The conclusion that seems to emerge in this respect is that the voting of 
institutional investors is a collective process worked out by the voting advice 
providers under the collective guidance of institutional investors that subscribe to 
their services and interact with their voting advisors, although such interaction 
differs according to the characteristics of the services offered by each proxy advisor. 
The recourse to voting advice providers is probably an important precondition to 
allow institutional investors to cast their votes at all the shareholder meetings of 
their portfolio shares.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
Starting from the observation that at the multilateral level shareholder activism is 
considered as an important aspect of good corporate governance, this paper has 
examined several legal and economic obstacles to institutional investor activism in 
the EU and in the US. We also examined the voting record of 76 institutional 
investors in the US and of several others in the EU. 
 
The results of our research show in the first place that participation at shareholder 
meetings is significantly higher in the US than in the EU. In turn, the situation in 
the EU is very different across some of its main Member States, with the UK 
showing a higher voting participation. The UK is also the European country with 
the higher ownership fragmentation and the higher percentage of total shares held 
by institutional investors. The reasons for the lower voting presence in the EU seem 
to be related to the difficulty to have access to proxy voting and the rational apathy 
of institutional investors not to take part in voting in companies for which they own 
a small number of shares. Legal obstacles to proxy voting have just been lowered 
through the adoption of the Shareholder Rights Directive, while the willingness of 
institutional investors to vote at shareholder meetings seems to be increasing also 
due to the encouragement from multilateral fora, national supervisory authorities, 
and self-regulatory bodies. Institutional investors active in the EU are also 
differentiating their equity portfolios across companies listed all over the EU, 
something which should contribute to reduce in the near future national differences 
in voting attendance.  
 
Institutional investor activism has also been encouraged in recent times by the 
rising number of hedge funds that have a equity portfolio focused in a limited 
number of companies, in which they hold significant share holdings. Such a trend 
is more visible in the US, but is also beginning to spread in the EU. The specificity 
of this kind of investors translates in the higher propensity, vis-à-vis "traditional" 
institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds, to put in place 
proxy fights.  
 
We also found that conflicts of interest seem to limit the activism of several 
categories of institutional investors both in the US and in the EU; that some 
national legislations limit the ability of institutional investors to coordinate their 
                                                 
153 http://www.proxygovernance.com  
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voting policies and practices; and that recourse to stock lending and other forms of 
separation of financial risk from voting rights seems to be practiced more by 
controlling shareholders at the expense of institutional investors than the opposite.  
 
We then moved on to examine institutional investors' voting record in the US and in 
the EU through new data covering 76 institutional investors' voting records in the 
US and 6 institutional investors' voting records in the EU. Our observation is that 
institutional investors in the US seem to have a significantly more adversarial 
voting pattern vis-à-vis company managements than in the UK, something which 
might be connected to the fewer voting rights given to shareholders by the US 
regulatory framework.  
 
As for Europe, institutional investors' voting pattern is by far the most adversarial 
in France, where there is a high incidence of control-enhancing mechanisms. 
Institutional investors seem to have an adversarial voting stance also in Greece, 
Belgium and Sweden, where control-enhancing mechanisms are also present, while 
in Italy they tend to have a low voting turnout. More in general, EU investors’ voting 
pattern seems to be sensitive to the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms, 
ownership concentration, and to the origin of the national legal system. 
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Table 1. Share ownership of European listed companies in 2005 
 
  Foreign 
investors 
median=100 Collective 
investment 
median=100 Banks 
and 
other 
median=100 Private 
non 
financial 
companies 
median=100 Individual 
investors/ 
households 
median=100 Public 
sector 
median=100 
France  39% 115 20% 143 9% 180 15% 100 6% 38 11% 147 
Germany 
(2004) 
21% 62 8% 57 7% 140 42% 280 15% 94 7% 93 
Italy 13% 38 12% 86 11% 220 28% 187 26% 163 10% 133 
Netherlands 
(2003) 
69% 203 12% 86 0 0 Na Na 11% 69 2% 27 
Poland 38% 112 16% 114 1% 20 8% 53 17% 106 20% 267 
Spain 34% 100 9% 64 8% 160 25% 167 24% 150 0.30% 4 
Sweden 34% 100 26% 186 3% 60 11% 73 18% 113 8% 107 
UK 33% 97 49% 350 2% 40 2% 13 14% 88 0.10% 1 
EU 
weighted 
average  
33%   24%   7%   16%   15%   5%   
US 
(2004/5) 
    60% (of 
which 24% 
mutual 
funds and 
10% 
pension 
funds) 
                  
Median 34%   14%   5%   15%   16%   8%   
 
Source: FESE (2007), Kahan and Rock (2007b), Rothberg and Lilien (2006) and our elaborations. 
 
 
Table 2. Attendance rate at GMs of foreign shareholders 
 
THYSSEN KRUPP (German issuer) 
 Foreign shareholders Domestic shareholders 
As % of total share capital 20% 80% 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 0,4% (2%*) 53,6% (67%**) 
* As a percentage of total shares owned by foreign shareholders  
** As a percentage of total shares owned by domestic shareholders 
 
MAN AG (German issuer) 
 Foreign shareholders Domestic shareholders 
As % of total share capital 37 % 63 % 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 0,1 % (0,27 %*) 45,4 % (72,06 %**) 
 
VOLKSWAGEN AG (German issuer) 
 Foreign shareholders Domestic shareholders 
As % of total share capital 50 % 50 % 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 5 % (10%*) 35% (70%**) 
* As a percentage of total shares owned by foreign shareholders  
** As a percentage of total shares owned by domestic shareholders 
 
ARBEITSKREIS NAMENSAKTIE (The working group of the larger German companies with registered shares)  
Figures of German DAX-companies with registered shares (Epcos is a TecDAX   
constituent)     
    
Foreign 
shareholders Domestic 
shareholders  
Allianz AG As % of total share capital 50 50,0  
2004 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 6,3 (12,6)* 30,8 (61,6)**  
DaimlerChrysler AG As % of total share capital 43,0 57,0  
2005 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 15,3 (35,6)* 22,6 (39,6)**  
Deutsche Bank AG As % of total share capital 45,9% 54,1%  
2004 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 11,8 (25,7)* 20,2 (37,3)**  
Deutsche Börse AG As % of total share capital 57,7 42,3  
2003 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 12,1 (21,0)* 32,5 (76,8)**  
Dt. Lufthansa AG As % of total share capital 24,3 75,7  
2004 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 7,7 (31,7)* 33,4 (44,1)**  
Deutsche Post AG As % of total share capital 17,9% 82,1%  
2004 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 3,4% (19,0%)* 69,5% (84,7%)**  
Dt. Telekom AG As % of total share capital 32,1 67,9  
2003 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 2,7 (8,4)* 56,8 (83,6)**  
Epcos AG As % of total share capital 45,0 55,0  
2005 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 22,5  (50,0)* 23,9 (43,5)**  
Infineon Techn. AG As % of total share capital 47,6 52,4  
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2005 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 17,0 (35,7)* 31,0 (59,2)**  
Münchener Rück AG As % of total share capital 45,2 54,8  
2005 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 9,1 (20,1)* 33,7 (61,0)**  
Siemens AG As % of total share capital 56,2 43,8  
2005 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital) 12 (21,4)* 21,6 (49,3)**  
* As a percentage of total shares owned by foreign shareholders   
** As a percentage of total shares owned by domestic shareholders   
     
Source: DEUTSCHES AKTIENSTITUT 
 
FCSD – Finnish Central Securities Depository Ltd 
 Foreign shareholders Domestic shareholders 
As % of total share capital                   31.71% 68.29% 
Present at GM (as % of total share 
capital)      8.46% (18.46%*)       38.76% (54.12%**) 
* As a percentage of total shares owned by foreign shareholders 
** As a percentage of total shares owned by domestic shareholders 
 
According to FCSD the attendance rate at GMs of foreign shareholders varies from 0% to 70-90% in different companies applying the same 
arrangements based on our Companies Act. The wide variety in attendance rate with basically similar rules (Companies Act ja by-laws) 
applied in all companies proves that the present company law framework works well enough and that the attendance at GMs depends 
mostly on other factors than the company law provisions dealing with shareholders´ right to attend GM. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of votable share positions notified by ISS to institutions which subsequently are voted by those same 
institutions (June 2003- June 2005). 
 
Market Blocking Vote Return Rate (%) Median=100 
Australia  no 67,6 154 
Spain  no 71,2 162 
UK  no 76,6 174 
Argentina  yes 49,2 112 
Austria  yes 34 77 
Belgium  yes 32,8 75 
France  yes 37,6 86 
Germany  yes 49,4 113 
Greece  Yes 20,5 47 
Netherlands  Yes 43,9 100 
Portugal  Yes 34,2 78 
Median  43,9 100 
Source: ISS and our elaborations 
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Table 4. “DE FACTO” SHARE-BLOCKING PROVISIONS AND “FREE-FLOAT” VOTE 
 
Countries Attendance rate 
of the free float 
Market practice rules (driven by 
custodians’ internal rules) 
Legal rule 
Belgium* 20.00% - Deadline to send proxy voting 
instructions to custodians: 7 days prior 
to GM 
- Blocking: 6 days ca 
Share-blocking: Generally 3-6 days before meeting 
France* 17.45% - Deadline to send proxy voting 
instructions to custodians: 8 days prior 
to GM 
- Blocking: 5 days ca. Actually, blocked 
shares can be traded up to 3 ay prior to 
GM. Trading would imply cancellation of 
votes cast 
Prior to the reform154 the blocking date used to be 
5 days before the meeting. Nowadays, unless the 
shareholder’s name is recorded in the company 
shareholders list (if any) prior to the meeting, the 
"Freezing” of the shares to be voted (immobilisation 
or certificat d'indisponibilité des actions) is still 
requested by French law. However the NRE decree 
allows for a defreezing prior to the GM in case of 
the sale of the shares. 
Germany* 10.05% - Deadline to send proxy voting 
instructions to custodians: 7 days prior 
to GM 
- Blocking: 6 days ca. Actually, blocked 
shares can be traded up to 3 any prior to 
GM. Trading would imply cancellation of 
votes cast 
Blocking has been abolished in 2005. It used to be 
about 5 days before GM 
Italy* 4.40  - Deadline to send proxy voting 
instructions to custodians: 7 days prior 
to GM 
- Blocking: 6 days ca. 
Used to require a 5 days blocking period. Current 
rules vary from company to company (with a 
maximum blocking period of 2 days before GM).155 
However most of the custodians still apply a 
blocking system. 
Netherlands* 12.95% - Deadline to send proxy voting 
instructions to custodians: 5 days prior 
to GM 
- Blocking: 5 days ca 
Blocking has been abolished by the Law 15 
December 1999, art. 2:119, which establish record 
date procedure (max 7 days ahead of GM). Prior to 
the reform the blocking date used to be 5-6 days 
before the meeting. 
Sweden 45%** Record date Re-registration 10 days prior to GM 
UK 40.20%-53.20% Record date Record date: 48 hours before the GM 
*) 2003 data 
**) Data based on a small sample 
Source: Deminor country ratings 2003-2004, Manifest Voting Review 2004, JP Morgan internal rules manual 2004-5, Hermes calculation 
 
Table 5. Voting costs charged to investors by voting intermediaries 
 
Estimates range from a minimum to a maximum value Costs for investors 
%    
Understanding the framework - Costs due to lack of 
harmonisation (E) 
11.1 
   
Voting platform (F) 1.8    
Powers of attorney (E) 1    
Re-registration of shares (E) 4.5    
Share-blocking (E) 58.9    
Voting in remote areas (E) 0.3    
Lack of voting in absentia facilities (E) 0.2    
Voting recommendations (F) 9.8    
Lack of timely/exhaustive information on agenda items (E) 12.4    
Total  100    
 
*) "F" stands for fixed costs, due to setting up a global voting system.  
"E" stands for ad hoc costs due to voting in European countries. 
 
Source: Hermes.  
                                                 
154 Regulation has been amended by Decree dated May 3, 2002 (art. 38 modifying art. 136 of the Decree dated March 23, 1967). 
155 As per Vietti reform and companies articles of association amended after 1/1/2004. 
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Table 6. The discipline of acting in concert across the EU  
 
 Ambiguity Explicit provisions against 
investor activism 
Germany* High High 
France  Low High  
Italy Average Low 
UK Low Low 
   
 
Including the reform proposal currently under discussion by the German Parliament 
 
Table 7. Ownership concentration 
Widely held is the fraction of firms with no controlling shareholder among the 20 largest companies by stock market capitalization at the 
end of 1995. A company has a controlling shareholder if the sum of a shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights exceeds 20 percent. 
Family control is the fraction of the 20 largest companies where the controlling shareholder is an individual. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Table 2. Pyramid control is the fraction of the 20 largest companies, where the controlling shareholder exercises 
control through at least one publicly traded company. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Table 4. Median largest block 
is the median size of the largest ultimate voting block for listed industrial companies. Source: Barca and Becht (2001). Family wealth is the 
percentage of total stock market capitalization controlled by the 10 richest families. Source: Faccio and Lang (2002), Table 10. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Widely held 
  
Family control Pyramid control Median largest 
block 
Family wealth 
France 60% 20% 15% 20% 29% 
Germany 50% 10% 20% 57% 21% 
Italy 20% 15% 20% 55% 20% 
United 
Kingdom 100% 0% 0% 10% 6% 
United 
States 80% 20% 0% 
5% (NYSE) 
9% (Nasdaq) 
NA 
  
Source: Enriques and Volpin (2007). 
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Table 8. Ownership concentration in listed companies: main European companies (2003) 
 
 companies 
considered 
weight Average free-float Weighted average 
free-float 
Percentage of 
widely-held 
companies 
Austria 11 58.1 57.1 46.8 18.2 
Denmark 24 82.9 74.2 61.2 50 
Bel, Fra, Ned, Por 197 86.4 66.4 74.7 37.6 
Finland 26 85.7 79 89.3 53.8 
Germany 87 76.3 67 72.9 37.9 
Greece 28 65.1 57.9 58.6 21.4 
Ireland 16 80.6 89.2 95 75 
Italy 79 90 56.9 59.1 17.7 
Norway 15 79.9 67 46.2 33.3 
UK 317 92.9 91.4 96.1 83.3 
Spain  49 61.4 59.1 70.3 26.5 
Sweden  56 87.3 77.2 77.9 51.8 
Switzerland 76 92.5 78.7 87 57.9 
 
Source: Bianchi et al. (2005).  
 
Table 9. Average voting turnout in 2006 
 
Country Voting turnout Median=100 
UK (FTSE 350) 61% 107 
Netherlands   36% 63 
Italy   52% 91 
France   57% 100 
Germany (Dax30) 49% 86 
Spain   65% 114 
US (S&P 500) 87% 153 
Median 57%  
 
Source: PIRC (2007) and our elaborations 
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Table 10. Hermes BT portfolio: voting record 
The Table represents in the first column the countries where Hermes has voted in the period 2nd half 2006-first half 2007; the second 
column indicates the number of meetings in which Hermes has voted in each country; the third column the number of items at the meeting 
for which Hermes has abstained; the fourth column the number of items at meeting for which Hermes voted against; the fifth column the 
number of company meetings in which Hermes voted in favour for all the items; the sixth the number of shareholder resolutions for which 
Hermes voted in favour (votes against shareholder resolution are included with the votes in favour of management). 
 
Country Number of 
Meetings 
voted 
Number of 
Abstain votes 
(average per meeting) 
 
Number of 
Against votes 
(average per meeting) 
 
Number (perc) of 
Meetings 
voted all for 
For 
(Shareholder 
resolution)* 
Austria 12 0 6 (0.5) 8 (0.67) 0 
Belgium 31 0 31 (1) 15 (0.48) 0 
Denmark 24 1 (0.04) 3 (0.1) 20 (0.83) 0 
Finland 24 0 2 (0.1) 19 (0.79) 3 
France 83 5 (0.06) 313 (3.8) 17 (0.20) 5 
Germany 68 3 (0.04) 18 (0.3) 54 (0.79) 0 
Greece 26 0 40 (1.5) 6 (0.23) 0 
Ireland 14 0 6 (0.4) 9 (0.64) 0 
Italy 72 4 (0.05) 23 (0.3) 56 (0.78) 0 
Luxembourg 9 0 2 (0.2) 7 (0.78) 0 
Netherlands 50 0 22 (0.4) 39 (0.78) 0 
Norway 29 0 4(0.1) 25 (0.86) 0 
Portugal 13 0 7 (0.5) 10 (0.77) 0 
Spain 44 0 44 (1) 23 (0.52) 0 
Sweden 44 0 2 (0.04) 42 (0.95) 0 
Switzerland 37 0 13 (0.3) 31 0.84) 0 
UK* 999 17(0.02) 71 (0.07) 893 (0.89) ? 
US 663  151 (0.2) 444 (0.67) 142 
Canada 169  28 (0.2) 138 (0.81) 1 
Source: our elaboration on Hermes data published at www.hermes.co.uk  
* Under the UK law abstain votes are not considered in determining the level of support or dissent for a proposal, although they are 
included for the purposes of determining voting turnout. 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Hermes BT portfolio: voting record – comparative statistics 
The fourth column indicates the average number of against votes over the meetings in which  
 
 
Country All for/total meeting 
Number of  
meeting no all for 
Average number of  
Against by  
Meeting no all for 
Average  
number of  
Shareholder  
Resolutions 
Austria 0,67 4 1,5 0 
Belgium 0,48 16 1,94 0 
Denmark 0,83 4 0,75 0 
Finland 0,79 5 0,4 0,6 
France 0,2 66 4,74 0,08 
Germany 0,79 14 1,29 0 
Greece 0,23 20 2 0 
Ireland 0,64 5 1,2 0 
Italy 0,78 16 1,44 0 
Luxembourg 0,78 2 1 0 
Netherlands 0,78 11 2 0 
Norway 0,86 4 1 0 
Portugal 0,77 3 2,33 0 
Spain 0,52 21 2,1 0 
Sweden 0,95 2 1 0 
Switzerland 0,84 6 2,17 0 
     
country     
Bermuda 0,73 6 2,33 0,17 
British V.I. 1 0 0 0 
Canada 0,82 31 0,9 0,03 
Cayman Islands 0,78 2 1,5 0 
Marshall Islands 1 0 0 0 
Mauritius 1 0 0 0 
Netherlands Antilles 1 0 0 0 
USA 0,67 219 0,69 0,59 
     
     
country     
Guernsey 0,94 2 0,5 0 
Ireland 1 0 0 0 
Isle of Man 1 0 0 0 
Jersey 0,78 2 0,5 0 
U.K. 0,89 105 0,67 0 
UK 0 1 1 0 
     
Source: our elaboration on Hermes data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Voting record in the US of 75 mutual funds 
Percentages. See table 14 for the list of the 75 funds considered. Data refer to the period July 2003 January 2008.  
 
Management proposals sh proposals 
 Against abstain in favour  against abstain in favour 
a 2300 495 51950 bi 3348 55 1438 
c 6527 321 29555 ec 7814 403 4866 
cg 270 114 5992 es 5068 1540 863 
d 45126 3558 369263 l 1997 557 653 
m 146 70 3714 os 5244 628 1715 
n 252 9 831 p 3255 855 666 
om 3162 945 13374 svr 3245 154 5009 
s 1230 256 5778 td 1077 64 4485 
tot 59013 5768 480457 tot 31048 4256 19695 
perc 0,11 0,01 0,88 perc 0,56 0,08 0,36 
 
Source: our elaborations based on data provided by Andy Eggers, www.proxydemocracy.org 
 
Table 13. Detail of the 75 US mutual funds considered in our voting record survey 
 
id,"ticker","name","fund_family" 
1,"DSEFX","Domini Social Equity Fund","Domini Social Funds" 
2,"CSXAX","Calvert Social Index Fund","Calvert Funds" 
3,,"CalPERS", 
4,,"CBIS (Christian Brothers Investment Service)", 
5,"FKINX","Franklin Income Fund","Franklin Templeton Funds" 
6,"MUTHX","Franklin Mutual Shares Fund","Franklin Templeton Funds" 
7,"BEGRX","Franklin Mutual Beacon Fund","Franklin Templeton Funds" 
8,"PRFDX","T Rowe Price Equity Income Fund","T Rowe Price Funds" 
9,"PRGFX","T Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund","T Rowe Price Funds" 
10,"TRBCX","T Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund","T Rowe Price Funds" 
11,"PREIX","T Rowe Price Equity Index 500 Fund","T Rowe Price Funds" 
12,"SNXFX","Schwab 1000 Index Fund","Schwab Funds" 
13,"SWPIX","Schwab Capital Trust S&P 500 Index Fund","Schwab Funds" 
14,"SWANX","Schwab Capital Trust Core Equity Fund","Schwab Funds" 
15,"SWHEX","Schwab Hedged Equity Fund","Schwab Funds" 
16,"GSCGX","Goldman Sachs Capital Growth","Goldman Sachs Funds" 
17,"GSGRX","Goldman Sachs Growth & Income","Goldman Sachs Funds" 
18,"FALDX","Federated American Leaders","Federated Funds" 
19,"FEDEX","Federated Capital Appreciation Fund","Federated Funds" 
20,"MXCCX","Federated Max-Cap Index Fund","Federated Funds" 
21,"DGAGX","Dreyfus Appreciation Fund","Dreyfus Funds" 
22,"PEOPX","Dreyfus S&P 500 Index Fund","Dreyfus Funds" 
23,"DREVX","Dreyfus Fund","Dreyfus Funds" 
24,"SGROX","Wells Fargo Advantage Growth","Wells Fargo Funds" 
25,"SFCSX","Wells Fargo Advantage Equity Index","Wells Fargo Funds" 
26,"STFRX","Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2040","Wells Fargo Funds" 
27,"SHRAX","Legg Mason Partners Aggressive Growth","Smith Barney Funds" 
28,"SHAPX","Legg Mason Partners Appreciation Fund","Smith Barney Funds" 
29,"SBSPX","Legg Mason Partners S&P 500 Index Fund","Smith Barney Funds" 
30,"SSIAX","Legg Mason Partners Social Awareness","Smith Barney Funds" 
31,"PGRWX","Putnam Fund for Growth and Income","Putnam Funds" 
32,"KDHAX","DWS Dreman High Return Equity Fund","DWS Funds" 
33,"SCDGX","DWS Growth & Income Fund","DWS Funds" 
34,"BTIEX","DWS Equity 500 Index Fund","DWS Funds" 
35,"EVSYX","Evergreen Large Cap Equity","Evergreen Funds" 
36,"EGIAX","Evergreen Fundamental Large Cap","Evergreen Funds" 
37,"ESINX","Evergreen Equity Index","Evergreen Funds" 
38,"MSFRX","MFS Total Return Fund","MFS Funds" 
39,"MEIAX","MFS Value Fund","MFS Funds" 
40,"TWCUX","American Century Ultra","American Century Funds" 
41,"TWCGX","American Century Growth","American Century Funds" 
42,"BIGRX","American Century Income & Growth","American Century Funds" 
43,"ACSTX","Van Kampen Comstock","Van Kampen Funds" 
44,"ACEGX","Van Kampen Strategic Growth","Van Kampen Funds" 
45,"JANSX","Janus Fund","Janus Funds" 
46,"JAVLX","Janus Twenty Fund","Janus Funds" 
47,"JAGIX","Janus Growth and Income Fund","Janus Funds" 
48,"DIVAX","Morgan Stanley Dividend Growth Securities","Morgan Stanley Funds" 
49,"AMOAX","Morgan Stanley Focus Growth","Morgan Stanley Funds" 
50,"SPIBX","Morgan Stanley S&P 500 Index","Morgan Stanley Funds" 
51,"INDZX","RiverSource Diversified Equity Income Fund","RiverSource Funds" 
52,"ADIDX","RiverSource S&P 500 Index Fund","RiverSource Funds" 
53,"NBSRX","Neuberger Berman Socially Responsive","Neuberger Berman Funds" 
54,"DRTHX","Dreyfus Premier Third Century Fund","Dreyfus Funds" 
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55,"CSIEX","Calvert Social Investment Fund","Calvert Funds" 
56,"CLGAX","Calvert Large Cap Growth Fund","Calvert Funds" 
57,"PAXWX","Pax World Balanced Fund","Pax World Funds" 
58,"PXWGX","Pax World Growth Fund","Pax World Funds" 
59,"PARNX","Parnassus Fund","Parnassus Funds" 
60,"MMPAX","MMA Praxis Core Stock Fund","MMA Praxis Funds" 
61,"WAIDX","Citizens Funds Core Growth/Standard","Citizens Funds" 
62,"VFINX","Vanguard 500 Index","Vanguard Funds" 
63,"VTSMX","Vanguard Total Stock Market Index","Vanguard Funds" 
64,"VWNFX","Vanguard Windsor II","Vanguard Funds" 
65,"VWELX","Vanguard Wellington","Vanguard Funds" 
66,"FCNTX","Fidelity Contrafund","Fidelity Funds" 
67,"FMAGX","Fidelity Magellan","Fidelity Funds" 
68,"FSMAX","Fidelity Spartan 500 Index","Fidelity Funds" 
69,"FMILX","Fidelity New Millennium","Fidelity Funds" 
70,"TIGEX","TIAA-CREF Growth Equity Fund","TIAA-CREF Funds" 
71,"TIGIX","TIAA-CREF Growth & Income Fund","TIAA-CREF Funds" 
72,"TCEIX","TIAA-CREF Equity Index Fund","TIAA-CREF Funds" 
73,"TCSCX","TIAA-CREF Social Choice Equity Fund","TIAA-CREF Funds" 
74,"DODGX","Dodge & Cox Stock Fund","Dodge & Cox Funds" 
75,"DODBX","Dodge & Cox Balanced Fund","Dodge & Cox Funds" 
Source: our elaborations based on data provided by Andy Eggers, www.proxydemocracy.org Socially responsible funds are in yellow. 
 
 
Table 14. Types of Proposals in the US 
Management proposals: 
a -- Auditor Ratification   
cg -- Corporate Governance  
d -- Director Election  
c -- Executive Compensation  
s -- Issuance of Stock  
m -- Merger/Acquisition Agreement  
om -- Other Management Proposals  
 
Shareholder Proposals  
bi -- Board Independence and Performance  
l -- Employment and Working Conditions  
es -- Environmental and Social  
ec -- Executive Compensation  
os -- Other Shareholder Proposals  
p -- Political Influence and Charitable Contributions  
td -- Takeover Defenses  
svr -- Voting Rules  
 
Source: our elaborations based on data provided by Andy Eggers, www.proxydemocracy.org  
 
Table 15. Proposals by year in the US 
 
           |                               year 
 prop_code |      2003       2004       2005       2006       2007       2008 |     Total 
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         a |       142      1,228      1,379      1,399      2,517         98 |     6,763  
           |      7.39       8.70       9.06       9.01       9.91      11.32 |      9.26  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        bi |         2         51         36         63        106          7 |       265  
           |      0.10       0.36       0.24       0.41       0.42       0.81 |      0.36  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         c |       156      1,001      1,021        898      1,444         54 |     4,574  
           |      8.12       7.10       6.71       5.78       5.69       6.24 |      6.26  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        cg |        17        117        125        158        215          0 |       632  
           |      0.88       0.83       0.82       1.02       0.85       0.00 |      0.87  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         d |     1,269      9,456     10,323     10,564     17,325        582 |    49,519  
           |     66.06      67.03      67.81      68.01      68.23      67.21 |     67.79  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        ec |        17        156        161        132        260          1 |       727  
           |      0.88       1.11       1.06       0.85       1.02       0.12 |      1.00  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        es |         6         74         75         87        117          2 |       361  
           |      0.31       0.52       0.49       0.56       0.46       0.23 |      0.49  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         l |         2         36         38         42         44          0 |       162  
           |      0.10       0.26       0.25       0.27       0.17       0.00 |      0.22  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         m |        30        106        135        156        268         15 |       710  
           |      1.56       0.75       0.89       1.00       1.06       1.73 |      0.97  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         n |         0          2          6          0        949         78 |     1,035  
           |      0.00       0.01       0.04       0.00       3.74       9.01 |      1.42  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        om |       177      1,100      1,257      1,283      1,323         17 |     5,157  
           |      9.21       7.80       8.26       8.26       5.21       1.96 |      7.06  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        os |        15        174        107         68         69          0 |       433  
           |      0.78       1.23       0.70       0.44       0.27       0.00 |      0.59  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         p |         2         52         35         46         55          1 |       191  
           |      0.10       0.37       0.23       0.30       0.22       0.12 |      0.26  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
         s |        69        388        344        402        567         11 |     1,781  
           |      3.59       2.75       2.26       2.59       2.23       1.27 |      2.44  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
       svr |         4         54        103        148         84          0 |       393  
           |      0.21       0.38       0.68       0.95       0.33       0.00 |      0.54  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
        td |        13        112         79         86         50          0 |       340  
           |      0.68       0.79       0.52       0.55       0.20       0.00 |      0.47  
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,921     14,107     15,224     15,532     25,393        866 |    73,043  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
Source: our elaborations based on data provided by Andy Eggers, www.proxydemocracy.org  
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Voting record by proposal in the US 
The table illustrates the voting record of the 75 institutional investors (listed in table 14) according to proposal. The list of the proposals is 
displayed in table 15. Data refer to the period July 2003 January 2008. Shareholder proposals are in bold.  
 
 
 a bi c cg d ec es l m n om os p S svr td 
Votes 
against 
proposal 
2300 3348 6527 270 45126 7814 5068 1997 146 252 3162 5244 3255 1230 3245 1077 
Votes 
against 
proposal 
(perc) 
0.04 0.69 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.6 0.68 0.62 0.04 0.23 0.18 0.69 0.68 0.17 0.38 0.19 
Abstain 
votes  
495 55 321 114 3558 403 1540 557 70 9 945 628 855 256 154 64 
Abstain 
votes 
(perc) 
0.009 0.01 0.009 0.02 0.008 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.008 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Votes in 
favour 
of 
proposal  
51950 1438 29555 5992 369263 4866 863 653 3714 831 13374 1715 666 5778 5009 4485 
votes in 
favour 
of 
proposal 
(perc) 
0.94 0.30 0.81 0.94 0.88 0.37 0.11 0.20 0.94 0.76 0.76 0.23 0.14 0.79 0.59 0.80 
Total 
votes 
cast 
54745 4841 36403 6376 417947 13083 7471 3207 3930 1092 17481 7587 4776 7264 8408 5626 
 
Source: our elaborations based on data provided by Andy Eggers, www.proxydemocracy.org 
 
 
 
Table 17. Voting record by proposal in the US by 5 socially-engaged funds 
The table illustrates the voting record by proposal of the 5 institutional investors included in the list of 75 mutual funds listed in table 14. 
The list of the proposals is displayed in table 15. Data refer to the period July 2003 January 2008. Shareholder proposals are in bold.  
 
  a bi c cg d ec es l m n om os p S svr td 
Votes 
against 
proposal 
237 50 1089 35 14157 169 23 26 28 64 326 114 55 123 102 41 
Votes 
against 
proposal 
(perc) 
0,05 0,24 0,33 0,10 0,43 0,25 0,09 0,14 0,09 0,24 0,32 0,31 0,22 0,23 0,23 0,12 
Abstain 
votes  
16 1 11 2 141 7 3 1 3 0 9 5 1 3 1 1 
Abstain 
votes 
(perc) 
0,004 0,005 0,003 0,006 0,004 0,010 0,012 0,005 0,009 0 0,009 0,013 0,004 0,006 0,002 0,003 
Votes in 
favour 
of 
proposal  
4108 157 2158 322 18315 501 227 164 293 201 674 253 198 412 337 293 
votes in 
favour 
of 
proposal 
(perc) 
0,94 0,75 0,66 0,90 0,56 0,74 0,90 0,86 0,90 0,76 0,67 0,68 0,78 0,77 0,77 0,87 
Total 
votes 
cast 
4361 208 3258 359 32613 677 253 191 324 265 1009 372 254 538 440 335 
 
Source: our elaborations based on data provided by Andy Eggers, www.proxydemocracy.org 
 
Table 18. Morley Fund Management voting in 2007 
Data refer to all shares voted in 2007 by Morley Fund Management. The second column refers to the percentage of meetings in which 
Morley voted in favour of management on all the items voted at a meeting.  
 
Country 
All for/total meeting  
(in brackets absolute numbers) 
Austria 17% (1/6) 
Belgium 23% (3/13) 
Denmark 100% (1/1) 
Finland 75% (3/4) 
France 9% (5/57) 
Germany 18% (6/34) 
Ireland 42% (5/12) 
Italy 43%(15/35) 
Luxembourg 0 (0/1) 
Netherlands 20% (5/25) 
Spain 17% (5/29) 
Sweden 10% (1/10) 
UK 57% (692/1212) 
Source: Morley  
 
Table 19. Provident voting in 2007 
Data refer to all shares voted in 2007 by Provident. In brackets the percentages of for, against and abstain votes on the total voting items. 
The "For" row refers to the voting items for which Provident voted in favour of the management. The "Abstain" row refers to the voting 
items for which Provident participated to the specific meeting and chose to vote "abstain". The "No Action" row refers to the voting items 
which have not been voted by Provident because Provident did not participate to the specific meeting. The "Non Voting Itels" row refers to 
items which were not supposed to be oted by shareholders (for which Provident in its disclosed voting record did not provide any 
specification under the column "vote"). The "Tot. voting items" row is the sum of "for", against", "abstain", and "no action" rows. The 
"Voted/voting" row refers to the percentage of items voted by Provident (row 8) on the total number of items admitted to shareholder 
voting (row 9). The last row refers to the number of meetings in which Provident voted in favour of management in all the voting items. 
Notice that Under the UK law abstain votes are not considered in determining the level of support or dissent for a proposal, although 
they are included for the purposes of determining voting turnout. 
 
 Italy France Germany UK Sweden Spain Netherlands Belgium 
1. Meetings 18 19 24 268 7 12 14 3 
2; Companies 12 19 24 240 5 9 13 2 
3. For (perc) 4 (0.67) 277 (0.80) 195 (0.94) 3372 
(0.98) 
110 (0.93) 129 
(0.98) 
112 (0.92) 0  
4. Against (perc) 0  58 (0.17) 8 (0.04) 37 (0.01) 8 (0.07) 1 (0.01) 5 (0.04) 0 
5. Abstain (perc) 2 (0.33) 10 (0.03) 5 (0.02) 41 (0.01) 0  1 (0.01) 5 (0.04) 0 
6. No Action (perc) 68 (0.9) 18 (0.04) 23 (0.09)  4 (0.001) 0 0 100 (0.45) 52 (1) 
7. Non Voting items 0 0 28 0 2 2 48 16 
8. For+against+abstain 6 345 208 3450 118 131 122 0 
9. Tot. voting Items 
(For+against+abstain+no 
action) 
74 363 231 3454 118 131 222 52 
10. Voting items/meeting 4.1 19.1 9.6 12.9 16.8 10.9  17.3 
11. Voted/voting items 
(8/9) 
0.08 0.95 0.90 0.99 1 1 0.55 0 
12. All for (perc) 0 3 (0.008) 9 (0.04) 243 
(0.07) 
3 (0.02) 7 (0.05) 3 (0.01) 0 
Source:http://www.friendsprovident.co.uk/common/layouts/subSectionLayout.jhtml?pageId=fpcouk/SitePageSimple:voting+record and 
our elaborations.  
 
 
Table 20. Percentage ownership of institutional investors in US stock markets 
Source: Gillan and Starks (2007) 
 
 
 
Table 21. Number of corporate governance proposals submitted over two separate periods 
Source: Gillan and Starks (2007), with our elaboration. In brackets the relative importance of each issue. 
 
Major issues 1987-1994 2001-2005 
Repeal classified boards 314 (2) 199 (4) 
Eliminate poison pill 249 (5) 220 (3) 
Cumulative voting 274 (4) 93 (6) 
Supermajority 21 (7) 47 (8) 
Audit-related 19 (8) 62 (7) 
Board-related 279 (3) 353 (2) 
Executive compensation 233 (6) 573 (1) 
other 653 (1) 183 (5) 
Total 2042 1730 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Standard Life Investments voting record in UK Jan 2005-Feb 2008 
 
Data refer to all shares voted in the UK 2007 by Standard Life. The second column refers to the number of meetings in which Standard 
Life did not vote against or abstained in at least one resolution.  
 
Country All for\total meeting 
Number of  
meeting no all\for 
Average number of  
Against by  
meeting 
Average  
number of  
Shareholder  
resolutions 
     
UK 85% (1940/2286)    
Source: www.standardlifeinvestments.com and our elaborations.  
 
Table 23. Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) voting record 
 
Source: http://www.norges-bank.no/default____25991.aspx and our elaborations. 
* Under the UK law abstain votes are not considered in determining the level of support or dissent for a proposal, although they are 
included for the purposes of determining voting turnout. 
 
 
Country Year Companies votes 
For (perc) 
Votes 
against 
management 
recommendations 
(perc) 
Votes 
Abstain 
(perc) 
Proposals 
Subject to 
voting (For+ 
Against+ 
Abstain) 
Belgium 2007 1 7 (1)   7 
France 2007 93 1369 (0.73) 492 (0.26) 2 (0.01) 1863 
Germany 2007 58 486(0.86) 81 (0.14)  567 
Netherlands 2007 10 94 (0.85) 16 (0.15)  110 
Spain 2007 40 496 (0.92) 39 (0.07) 6 (0.01) 541 
Sweden 2007 42 747 (0.93) 57 (0.07)  804 
UK* 2007 337 4237 (0.97) 102 (0.02) 26 (0.01) 4365 
Table 24. T.RowePrice voting record in the US.  
Data refer only to the invetor’s domestic stock funds.  
Proposal 
% Voted With 
Management 2006-
2007      
% Voted With 
Management 2005-
2006 
% Voted Against 
Management  2006-2007  
% Voted Against 
Management 2005-
2006 
Anti-Takeover Provisions 
(Management and Shareholder) 70% 73% 30% 27% 
Appoint/Ratify Auditors Proposals 
(Management) 99% 99% 1% 1% 
Capital Structure (Management) 91% 90% 9% 10% 
Compensation (Management) * All 
Types 85% 86% 15% 14% 
Auditor 96% 97% 4% 3% 
Director 94% 90% 6% 10% 
Employee Stock Purchase Plan 96% 98% 4% 2% 
Executive 82% 83% 18% 17% 
Option Plan Only 81% 83% 19% 17% 
Compensation (Shareholder)** All 
Types 39% 41% 61% 59% 
Auditor N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Director 100% 100% 0% 0% 
Employee Stock Purchase Plan N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Executive 39% 39% 61% 61% 
Option Plan Only 40% N/A 60% N/A 
Compensation (Management and 
Shareholder) All Types 79% 83% 21% 17% 
*Represents 95% of total 
compensation proposals        
**Represents 5% of total 
compensation proposals        
Director (Management and 
Shareholder) All Types 84% 78% 16% 22% 
Election of Directors (Management) 86% 81% 14% 19% 
Cumulative Voting (Management) 67% 75% 33% 25% 
Cumulative Voting (Shareholder) 24% 14% 76% 86% 
Declassify (Management) 100% 99% 0% 1% 
Declassify (Shareholder) 12% 2% 88% 98% 
Majority Vote for Election of 
Directors (Shareholder) 8% 3% 92% 97% 
Merger and Acquisition Proposals 
(Management) 96% 96% 4% 4% 
Separate Chairman and CEO 
(Shareholder) 62% 32% 38% 68% 
Social/Environ/Maximize 
Shareholder Value (Shareholder) All 
Types 
87% 85% 13% 15% 
Political Contributions 56% 55% 44% 45% 
Maximize Shareholder Value 71% 80% 29% 20% 
Social/Environmental Miscellaneous 95% 92% 5% 8% 
Total 87% 85% 13% 15% 
 
Source: 
http://www.troweprice.com/indexCorporatePopup/0,4527,lnp%253D10502%2526cg%253D2210%2526contentid%253D2210%2526pgi
d%253D12242,00.html?rfpgid=9899  
 
 
Table 25. Shareholder rights in the US and the EU : comparative table 
 
 Approval of 
conflicted 
transactions by 
disinterested 
shareholders 
Amend corporate 
charters/articles of 
association 
Remove 
directors 
Blocking 
minority 
Dividend 
distribution 
Mergers 
US No Proposed only by 
board 
Yes, but only at 
annual general 
meetings or at 
meetings 
convened by 
shareholders 
holding at least 
10% of voting 
capital.  
No Decided by the 
board 
Proposed by 
the board 
UK Yes Proposed by board 
and shareholders 
Shareholders 
may propose 
binding 
resolution at 
any time 
Yes Binding vote 
from 
shareholders 
Binding vote 
from 
shareholders 
France Yes Proposed by board 
and shareholders 
Shareholders 
may propose 
binding 
resolution at 
any time 
 Binding vote 
from 
shareholders 
Binding vote 
from 
shareholders 
Gerrmany No  Shareholders 
may propose 
binding 
resolution at 
any time (only 
for supervisory 
board 
members) 
 Adopted by 
supevisory 
board 
 
Italy No Proposed by board 
and shareholders 
Shareholders 
may propose 
binding 
resolution at 
any time 
Yes Binding vote 
from 
shareholders 
Binding vote 
from 
shareholders 
Source : our elaborations based on Bebchuk (2005), Shleifer (2007), Djankov et al. (2008), Hertig and McCahery (2006), and Bianchi-
Enriques (2001). Kraakman et al ?, Ferrarini ? 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26. Fidelity voting record 
Data refer to all shares voted in the period july 2006-June 2007 by Fidelity. In brackets the percentages of for, against and abstain votes 
on the total voting items. The "For" column refers to the voting items for which Fidelity voted in favour of the management. The "Abstain" 
column refers to the voting items for which Fidelity participated to the specific meeting and chose to vote "abstain". The "No Action" 
column refers to the voting items which have not been voted by Fidelity because Fidelity did not participate to the specific meeting. The 
"Tot. voting items" row is the sum of "for", against", "abstain", and "no action" columns. The "Voted/voting" column refers to the 
percentage of items voted by Fidelity on the total number of items admitted to shareholder voting. The last column refers to the number 
of meetings in which Fidelity voted in favour of management in all the voting items.  
Source : www.fidelity.com and our elaborations.  
 
Under the UK law abstain votes are not considered in determining the level of support or dissent for a proposal, although they are 
included for the purposes of determining voting turnout. 
 
 
 
  
Country Companies Meetings votes 
For (perc 
on total 
proposals 
subject to 
voting) 
Votes 
against 
management 
recommendations 
(perc on total 
proposals subject 
to voting) 
Votes 
Abstain 
(perc on 
total 
proposals 
subject to 
voting) 
No 
action 
Proposals 
Subject to 
voting (For+ 
Against+ 
Abstain+no 
action) 
Proposal 
per 
meeting 
All for 
(perc on 
the 
meetings) 
Belgium          
France 101 116 1611 
(0.82) 
160 (0.08) 160 
(0.08) 
33 
(0.02) 
1964 16.9 47 (0.4) 
Germany 88 94 771 
(0.95) 
36 (0.04) 0 0 807 8.6 79 (0.84) 
Netherlands          
Italy 76 111 256 
(0.65) 
4 (0.01) 18 (0.04) 114 
(0.29) 
392 3.5 66 (0.59) 
Sweden 45 57 797 
(0.94) 
17 (0.02) 4 (0.004) 29 
(0.03) 
847 14.8 42 (0.73) 
UK* 826 1123 9297 
(0.98) 
110 (0.01) 12 
(0.001) 
15 
(0.01) 
9434 8.4 1039 
(0.92) 
Table 27. Voting record in Europe: ranking of countries according to “for” votes 
Rankings are made from the tables of each investor considered: table 20 for Hermes, table 36 for Fidelity, table 33 
for NBIM, table 28 for Morley, and table 29 for Provident. 
 
Country Hermes Fidelity NBIM Morley Provident 
UK  1/5 1/6  1/8 
Germany  2/5 4/6  3/8 
France  4/5 6/6  6/8 
Italy  5/5   7/8 
Sweden  3/5 2/6  4/8 
Spain   3/6  1/8 
Netherlands   5/6  5/8 
Belgium     8/8 
 
 
Table 28. Voting record in Europe: ranking of countries according to “against” votes 
 
Country Hermes Fidelity NBIM Morley Provident 
UK 2/15 1/5 1/6  3/8 
Germany 7/15 4/5 3/6  5/8 
France 15/15 5/5 5/6  8/8 
Italy 8/15 1/5   1/8 
Sweden 4/15 3/5 2/6  7/8 
Finland 1/15     
Denmark 3/15     
Spain 13/15  2/6  3/8 
Portugal 14/15     
Norway 4/15     
Netherlands 11/15  4/6  5/8 
Ireland 6/15     
Belgium 10/15    1/8 
Austria 9/15     
Greece 11/15     
 
 
Table 29. Voting record in Europe: ranking of countries according to “all for” votes 
 
Country Hermes Fidelity NBIM Morley Provident 
UK 2/15 1/5  2/10 1/8 
Germany 5/15 2/5  7/10 3/8 
France 15/15 5/5  10/10 6/8 
Italy 7/15 4/5  3/10 7/8 
Sweden 1/15 3/5  9/10 4/8 
Finland 5/15   1/10  
Denmark 4/15     
Spain 12/15   8/10 2/8 
Portugal 9/15     
Norway 3/15     
Netherlands 7/15   6/10 5/8 
Ireland 11/15   4/10  
Greece 14/15     
Belgium    5/10 7/8 
 
 
Table 30. Voting record in Europe: ranking of countries according to “no action”  
Ranking goes from the companies with lower “no action” percentage to companies with higher “no action” 
percentage. 
 
Country Hermes Fidelity NBIM Morley Provident  
UK  2/5   3/8  
Germany  1/5   6/8  
France  3/5   4/8  
Italy  5/5   7/8  
Sweden  4/5   1/8  
Spain     1/8  
Netherlands     5/8  
Belgium     8/8  
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Table 31. Indicators on anti self-dealing provisions 
The table summarizes three series of indicators on anti-self dealing measures collected by Djankov et al. (2008). 
The first one (second column, values from zero to a maximum of four) refers to the presence of private enforcement 
provisions related to the adoption of conflicted transactions; the second one (third column, values from zero to a 
maximum of six) refers to ex-post private enforcement provisions; the third one (fouth column, values from zero to 
one) refers to the presence of public enforcement measures. The indicators refer to 2003 and are updated (second 
column only) according to Hertig and McCahery (2006) and our elaborations.  
Country Ex-ante control of self 
dealing 
Ex-post private control 
of self dealing  
Public enforcement 
UK 4/4  4.33/6 0/1 
US 2/4 5.75/6 0/1 
Germany 0.83/4 2.65/6 1/1 
France 1.50/4 3.30/6 0.50/1 
Italy 0.50/4 2.75/6 0/1 
Sweden 1/4 3.40/6 1/1 
Netherlands 0.33/4 1.10/6 0/1 
 
 
